Invasión Sovietica a Afghanistan 1979

Durante décadas, los soviéticos proveyeron de materiales y cursos de intrucción a las Fuerzas Armadas de Afganistán, que se vieron influenciadas por el marxismo.
En 1973 la monarquía había sido derrocada y tomó el poder Mohammed Daud Khan. El nuevo presidente pronto comenzó a enfrentarse al Partido Democrático Popular de Afganistán (PDPA, marxista), que inicialmente había sido su aliado.
En Afganistán alrededor del 97% de las mujeres y del 90% de los hombres eran analfabetos; alrededor del 5% de los propietarios poseían más del 50% de las tierras fértiles;1 sobre 17 millones de habitantes había 35 mil obreros pero 250 mil mulás; escasas industrias y carreteras; la esperanza de vida era de 40 años, la mortalidad infantil del 25% y la mitad de los niños morían antes de los cinco años;2 la mitad de la población sufría tuberculosis, una cuarta parte malaria3 y la desnutrición y el hambre eran comunes.4

En 1979, en la edición de enero de Problemas de la Paz y el Socialismo, un miembro del PDPA describió la situación anterior a la Revolución:

Las masas estaban dispuestas a rebelarse. El nivel de vida cayó de forma espectacular. Más de un millón de afganos emigraron a Irán. La legitimidad del gobierno se vio sacudida mal a los ojos del pueblo, las órdenes no se cumplían... Un hecho importante fue que estuvimos trabajando con la gente entre 13-14 años para ser un movimiento popular. Antes de la revolución, nuestro Partido ya era una fuerza formidable con 50 mil miembros y más simpatizantes, y ésto dio miedo al régimen.

Ya en 1970-72 había habido levantamientos campesinos y para comienzos de 1978 se vivía un clima de agitación, producto de la escasez de alimentos.


Eventos



Mir Akbar Kaibar.
El 17 de abril de 1978, Mir Akbar Kaibar (a veces escrito Khyber), destacado militante del PDPA, fue asesinado por agentes del régimen de Daud en la prisión de Pul-i-Charkhi, en Kabul. Hubo una manifestación de protesta espontánea de más de 10.000 personas.
Luego, los dirigentes del PDPA fueron encarcelados, incluyendo a Nur Mohammad Taraki y Babrak Karmal. Esta acción generó protestas civiles pacíficas que fueron reprimidas por la policía con el saldo de más de doscientos muertos. Sin embargo, Jafizulá Amín estuvo durante las cinco primeras horas bajo arresto domiciliario, dándole la oportunidad de ordenar un levantamiento de las Fuerzas Armadas (Amín trabajaba con los militares por disposición del Partido).
El levantamiento comenzó el día 27 en el Aeropuerto Internacional de Kabul y se extendió al resto de la ciudad en las siguientes veinticuatro horas. Además de los militares profesionales, colaboraron milicias populares.9 En la noche del 27 al 28 de abril unidades militares irrumpieron en el palacio en el corazón de Kabul. Con la ayuda de la fuerza aérea las tropas sublevadas vencieron la resistencia de la Guardia Presidencial. Daud murió durante el ataque.
Un ex-alto funcionario del gobierno de Daud relata los últimos días del régimen:


La puerta del palacio el 28-4-1978.
«A principios de 1978, Daud estaba decidido a poner fin al problema irritante del PDPA. Para agarrar el asunto de la cabeza, Daud planeó la muerte de Mir Akber Khyber, probablemente la personalidad más popular en Kabul y un miembro destacado del PDPA. La idea era sacar a la superficie a todos los dirigentes en el día de duelo público, detenerlos y tratar con ellos más tarde. Mir Akber Khyber, fue asesinado el 18 de abril de 1978. El 26 de abril, por la mañana temprano, Taraki, Karmal y otros líderes importantes del PDPA fueron arrestados y enviados a la cárcel. Esto provocó la revolución que puso fin a la dinastía Mohammadzai.10
[...] Habíamos subestimado el papel de todos los amigos del PDPA con los oficiales militares clave. De hecho, todos estábamos en una reunión de gabinete con Daud en el mismo día de la revolución. Estábamos hablando de varios posibles contingencias. Entonces, cuando estábamos tomando un pequeño descanso, un soldado entró en la habitación y le dio a Daud un pedazo de papel. Él lo leyó, lo metió en el bolsillo del pantalón y salió de la habitación. Pensamos que se había ido al baño. Más tarde nos enteramos de que estaba espiando afuera para ver lo que pasaba cerca de la enorme puerta del castillo real. Después regresó a la habitación, un oficial entró y pasó otra hoja de papel a un ministro. Este documento, que pasó de mano en mano contenía un mensaje conciso: "Hay una serie de tanques fuera de la puerta principal."
Daud fue al teléfono, pero pronto descubrió que él estaba hablando con el comandante que había enviado a los tanques. Los guardias tomaron posiciones en la parte superior del castillo y muy pronto comenzaron a pelear. Se dispersaron en desorden cuando los aviones se unieron a la refriega. No nos sorprendió especialmente cuando un oficial y una docena de soldados entraron en la habitación donde nosotros, los ministros, y Daud, su hermano Naim, y sus familias nos habíamos reunido. El oficial nos dijo que nos rindiéramos. Nos ordenó levantar las manos y separarnos en dos grupos, uno integrado sólo por los miembros de la familia real. De éste, todos ellos, incluyendo a Daud, fueron alineados contra la pared y fusilados.»11
El Cnel. Abdul Qadir tomó el mando del país, hasta el día 30, cuando se lo traspasó voluntariamente a Taraki. Cientos de miles de personas festejaron en las calles la victoria de la Revolución.4

Nuevo régimen


El gobierno marxista de Taraki inició un programa de reformas que eliminó la usura (de la que se beneficiaron once millones de campesinos), inició una campaña de alfabetización (por primera vez en las escuelas se enseñó en las lenguas nativas de los alumnos y también asistían mujeres), implantó una muy radical reforma agraria,12 separó la Iglesia del Estado, eliminó el cultivo del opio, legalizó los sindicatos y estableció una ley de salario mínimo.
El gobierno de Taraki también promovió la igualdad de derechos para las mujeres: permiso de no usar velo, permiso de transitar libremente y conducir automóviles, abolición de la compra de mujeres,1 integración de mujeres al trabajo y a estudios universitarios, así como a la vida política con cargos públicos.
Estados Unidos vio la situación como una oportunidad única para debilitar a la URSS, y el movimiento esencialmente marcó el final de la era de la distensión iniciada por el ex Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger. En 1978, los estadounidenses comenzaron a formar insurgentes y establecer emisiones de propaganda para Afganistán desde Pakistán.13 A principios de 1979, oficiales estadounidenses comenzaron a reunirse con los líderes insurgentes para determinar sus necesidades.14 De acuerdo con el entonces Consejero de Seguridad Nacional Zbigniew Brzezinski, la ayuda de la CIA a los insurgentes en Afganistán fue aprobado en julio de 1979.15 Brzezinski dijo que la ayuda a los mujaidines, que se inició bajo la administración Carter con la intención de provocar la intervención soviética, fue impulsado de manera significativa en la administración Reagan, que se había comprometido a hacer retroceder activamente la influencia comunista en el Tercer Mundo.

En un discurso pronunciado el 9 de abril de 1979, Taraki dijo:


«No ha habido fuerzas externas participando en la Revolución de Abril. Afganistán no importó ni exportó su Revolución... Puso en marcha un nuevo curso de la construcción de una sociedad libre de la explotación del hombre por el hombre.»7


Muchos informadores occidentales argumentaban que la Revolución afgana fue realizada por orden o patrocinio de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas. Sin embargo, la revista Time admitía el 28 de enero de 1980:
«El golpe de Estado marxista en el que Nur Muhammad Taraki derrocó a Daud en abril de 1978 sorprendió a los soviéticos tanto como a los americanos. La inteligencia occidental no ha sido capaz de encontrar la impresión del dedo ruso en el escenario de "la Revolución de Abril".»7
El gobierno soviético había tenido excelentes relaciones con la monarquía y las tuvo luego con el régimen de Daud; no quería un cambio drástico de relaciones sociales en ese país, le interesaba mantener el status quo.1 Por eso no intervino en la preparación de la Revolución y sólo la apoyaron una vez que había tomado el poder.

Afganistán: cuando los comunistas defendían los derechos de las mujeres.
La prensa y los gobiernos occidentales han encontrado ya un nuevo "Satán" que sustituye a los obsoletos Milosevic, Sadam Hussein, Gaddafi...: el terrorista islámico Bin Laden que les sirve para legitimar nuevas aventuras militares avivando los bajos instintos y la ignorancia de la opinión pública ¿Sabe alguien que dicho terrorista es un colaborador de la siniestra agencia de espionaje CIA desde 1979? ¿Sabe alguien que en Afganistán hubo de 1978 a 1992 un régimen progresista que protegió activamente los derechos de las mujeres? ¿Sabe alguien que para derrocarlo el gobierno USA creó y armó una corriente fanática integrista a la que hoy atribuye los atentados del 11 de setiembre?

Queremos que se conozca el drama del pueblo afgano en las vísperas de una nueva situación dolorosa y que aparezcan al descubierto todas las maniobras sucias realizadas por el imperialismo USA para someter y sojuzgar a dicho pueblo.

Afganistán: su tremendo atraso feudal

Afganistán ha sido y hoy sigue siendo uno de los países mas atrasados del Mundo caracterizado por la pobreza de su población, su heterogeneidad étnico cultural, sus relaciones sociales arcaicas y el dominio ejercido por una casta de señores feudales que se apoyan en la religión musulmana para autolegitimarse. Según datos de UNICEF en 1969 la tasa de mortalidad de niños menores de 5 años era la mayor del mundo: 380; la tasa bruta de mortalidad infantil era de las mayores: 30; la esperanza de vida era de 33 años. El atraso era padecido especialmente por las mujeres: en 1960 el 15 % de los niños acudía a la escuela pero únicamente el 2 % de las niñas. En 1970 el 13 % de los hombres estaba alfabetizado y sólo el 2 % de las mujeres.

El país era una monarquía de tipo medieval que ejercía un poder escaso y nominal sobre un conjunto de señores de la guerra y dirigentes étnicos y tribales asimismo dueños de la tierra.

En 1973 el rey Mohammed Zahir Shah fue derrocado por su primo Mohammed Daud que estableció un régimen republicano. Dicho régimen permitió la actividad de un Partido Comunista llamado Partido Democrático del Pueblo de Afganistán (PDPA), que tenía su base en la escasa intelectualidad urbana, los poco numerosos estudiantes y algunos oficiales del ejército. Su programa se centraba en la reforma agraria, la liberación de la mujer y la alfabetización de la población a desarrollar por un gobierno de ?obreros, campesinos, intelectuales ilustrados y progresistas, artesanos, la pequeña burguesía y los capitalistas nacionales?.

El nuevo régimen no sacó al país de su atraso y en 1978 intentó suprimir el PDPA.



La revolución de abril.

Sus partidarios en el ejército contraatacaron y derrocaron a Daud tomando el poder. El PDPA era un pequeño partido de 15 mil militantes dividido en varias fracciones. Una de ellas se hizo con el control del gobierno y reprimió a sus rivales. El fundador del partido Mohammed Taraki fue asesinado y varios miles de sus militantes encarcelados. Sus abusos echaron a los brazos de la oposición feudal a un sector campesino.

Pero el principal peligro viene de la contrarrevolución activamente apoyada y armada por la CIA norteamericana.

El gobierno USA y su CIA estimulan la creación de grupos terroristas formados por señores feudales afectados en sus privilegios por las reformas progresistas impulsadas por el PDPA en el gobierno. En 1978 la CIA instala en Islamabad (Pakistán) un cuartel general encargado de dirigir la guerra y el terrorismo contra el gobierno comunista. El asesor del presidente Carter Zbigniew Brzezinski coordina el suministro de armas a los terroristas. El agente de la CIA Louis Dupree dirige los instructores que adistran a terroristas en 120 campos de entrenamiento creados en Pakistán. La CIA coordina una coalición de gobiernos reaccionarios involucrados en esta guerra contra Afganistán: servicios secretos de la OTAN, Israel, Arabia Saudita y por supuesto la dictadura pakistaní. La ayuda que reciben las bandas terroristas era de mil millones de dólares anuales, proporcionados en su mayoría por los USA. Esta masa de dinero sirve para crear un fuerte movimiento integrista y extremista. Ante la magnitud de la ingerencia extranjera la URSS decide intervenir militarmente para sostener el gobierno afgano y depurar la camarilla que había cometido graves abusos.

En 1979 el rico saudí Usama Bin Laden colabora estrechamente con la CIA en la guerra sucia. Bin Laden integra las filas del Partido Islámico de Gulbudin Hekmatyar, antiguo jefe de la organización reaccionaria Hermanos Musulamanes también conectado con la CIA. Hekmatyar y sus terroristas se dedican a quemar vivos a campesinos, a destruir cientos de escuelas y hospitales, puentes y mezquitas. Otros jefes contrarrevolucionarios son ricos señores feudales: Mojaddedi era dueño de 2000 hectáreas, Mohammed Nabbi además estaba conectado con el Mossad sionista, Rabani era además exportador de alfombras. Son teólogo-terroristas que emplean el Islám para recuperar sus tierras y volver a explotar a los campesinos pobres.



Las reformas progresistas de la Revolución.

Los comunistas afganos tomaron medidas para sacar al Pueblo del atraso y la miseria. En un primer momento distribuyeron tierra a 250 mil campesinos, abolieron todas las deudas contraidas por los campesinos con los terratenientes, liberaron 8 mil presos políticos, declararon la educación universal para ambos sexos. La tasa de mortalidad infantil de menores de 5 años pasa de 380 en 1960 a 300 en 1988; el 80 % de la población urbana accede a servicios de salud; el 63 % de los niños y niñas realizan integramente el curso escolar en 1985-87; la esperanza de vida pasa de 33 años en 1960 a 42 en 1988. Centenares de miles de personas son alfabetizadas. Se aumenta en un 50 % el número de médicos, se dupkica el total de camas en los hospitales; se crean por primera vez jardines de infancia y casas de reposo para los trabajadores.

El gobierno comunista se esfuerza en sacar a las mujeres del tremendo atraso y opresión que sufren: el analfabetismo femenino es reducido del 98 al 75 % y miles de mujeres afganas dejan de usar el chador. Se incorporan a la producción e integran los destacamentos populares de defensa de la revolución con las armas en la mano. Los afiliados del PDPA que practican la poligamia son expulsados del partido. Incluso se incorporan a la vida política: las mujeres son una décima parte de la militancia del PDPA, cifra insuficiente pero que es un gran avance en comparación con la exclusión absoluta que sufren hoy bajo el régimen de los talibanes. La vicepresidenta de la Unión de Mujeres Democráticas Safika Razmiha declaró en 1988:"si no se logra la igualdad de la mujer en nuestra sociedad, es imposible avanzar por el camino del progreso social. Muchos miles de mujeres afganas aún están encerradas en los harenes, millones ocultan su rostro bajo el chador y el 75 % de ellas son analfabetas. La revolución afgana realiza un ingente trabajo para emancipar a la mujer. Pero la correlación de fuerzas es todavía favorable a los atrasos feudales".



Pero la prioridad es la guerra.

Pero es la guerra subversiva y terrorista a gran escala la principal preocupación del gobierno progresista y del Ejército Soviético que intentan defenderse de las oleadas de fanáticos que se lanzan desde los campos de Pakistán. De 1978 a 1986 destruyen casi 2 mil escuelas y 31 hospitales, saquean 906 cooperativas campesinas, destruyen empresas, centrales eléctricas y 41 mil km. de líneas de comunicación. Los que el presidente USA Reagan llama "luchadores de la libertad" entrenados por la CIA, Bin Laden entre ellos, se dedican a matar sin piedad mujeres, niños, ancianos, clérigos partidarios del gobierno, maestros. Matan al superior de la mezquita central de Kabul Maulan Abdul Hamid. Envenenan a cien adolescentes de 14 a 18 años de un liceo femenino de Kabul. Explotan bombas en una plaza comercial llena de gente, en un cine cuando se proyectaba una película para niños. Destruyen aviones civiles de la Afgan Airlines y otras compañias con los misiles Stingers norteamericanos y Blowpipes ingleses. Mas de 200 pasajeros son asesinados sin derecho al despliegue propagandistico de que son objeto los pasajeros de los aviones secuestrados el 11 de setiembre. La guerra está apoyada por la propaganda. En relación al pueblo afganos emiten 8 emisoras gubernamentales dirigidas por "Radio Kabul Libre" filial de la radio de la CIA la "Voz de America" instalada en Pakistán en lenguas afganas.

Los USA consiguen agotar a la URSS en esta guerra de desgaste en la que los asesinos integristas matan a miles de soldados soviéticos. En 1989 el traidor Gorbachov decide abandonar a su suerte al gobierno comunista retirando el Ejército Rojo sovietico. Investigadores norteamericanos reconocen que la CIA y el servicio secreto pakistaní ISI trabajaron intensamente codo a codo para derrocar dicho gobierno e instalar un poder integrista islámico . Para los años 90 miles de terroristas árabes son veteranos de esta guerra sucia y están dispuestos a aplicar sus métodos criminales contra la población campesina y lo soldados de Argelia, los cristianos coptos de Egipto, los civiles serbios y croatas y los comunistas de Bosnia-Herzegovina,etc.. La implicación de la CIA en la creación de ese foco de fanatismo dirigido contra los progresistas, los comunistas y la URSS es absoluta. La CIA pagaba los salarios de 4200 funcionarios de los partidos de oposición.



Caída de la esperanza y llegada del caos.

La oposición llamada en Occidente, incluso por la izquierda "de salón" "Resisencia", que no es mas que un amasijo de 300 comandantes enfrentados entre si y acostumbrados a llenarse los bolsillos con los dólares de la CIA, termina en 1992 por derribar el gobierno comunista. Las conquistas sociales son liquidadas y el país pasa a un nuevo tipo de guerra civil entre los diferentes jefes tribales.

La CIA, el régimen saudí y el general pakistaní Nasrullah Babar forman un grupo integrista aún más fanático y brutal que toma el poder en Kabul en 1996, los talibanes. Los USA pretenden que este régimen no dificulte la instalación de oleoductos que transporten el petróleo centro-asiático a manos de las petroleras yankis. Otras vías alternativas por Irán y China no son posibles. Los talibanes hacen saber mediante dos gestos lo que va a ser su política: arrastran por las calles de Kabul y cuelgan al último presidente comunista, Najibullah, y ordenan a las mujeres a esconderse debajo de de una espantosa pieza de tela. Sus antiguos amos de la CIA pensaron seguramente que su operación había tenido éxito y que Kabul "ya era libre". Poco imaginaban y tampoco sus aliados de la OTAN que los fanáticos integristas se iban a volver contra ellos cometiendo los devastadoras atentados de EEUU y otros lugares.

El pobre pueblo afgano tuvo una oportunidad de obtener un desarrollo pacífico y construir una sociedad más justa. La única ayuda que recibieron de Occidente fue las armas de los bandidos integristas, después las lágrimas de cocodrilo de algunas feministas pequeñoburguesas, los misiles de Clinton y hoy una nueva agresión contra el régimen que los propios occidentales contribuyeron a instalar. Pobre pueblo. Nuestro recuerdo para sus valientes hijos comunistas y patriotas.

Jose Antonio Egido

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Reforms and repression, 1978–1979

Once in power, the PDPA implemented a socialist agenda. It moved to promote state atheism.[7] The regime suppressed Muslims by: making men cut off their beards, women were not allowed to wear the burqa any longer, and most of the mosques were placed off limits at the start of the regime. The mosques re-opened in the 80s, because the party tried to win more supporters. It carried out an ambitious land reform, waiving farmers' debts countrywide and abolishing usury — intended to release the poorer farmers from debt peonage.[8]
The government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan moved to prohibit traditional practices which were deemed feudal in nature, including banning bride price (Mahr) and forced marriage. The minimum age for marriage was also raised. Education was stressed for both men and women and widespread literacy programmes were set up.[9] According to sources, in 1988, women made up 40 percent of the doctors and 60 percent of the teachers at the University of Kabul; 440,000 female students were enrolled in educational institutions and 80,000 more in literacy programs. Western dress was common in the cities, and women enjoyed freedom from having to cover their faces with veils.[10]

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Soviet image of an Afghan crowd, circa 1980. The crowd is wearing Western style clothing, with Western hairstyles.



Such reforms however were not universally well-received, being viewed by many Afghans (particularly in rural areas) as the imposition of secular western values considered to be alien to Afghan culture and un-Islamic. As had happened earlier in the century, resentment with the government's programme and the manner in which it was imposed, along with widespread repression, provoked a backlash from tribal and Islamic leaders.[9]
The PDPA invited the Soviet Union to assist in modernizing its economic infrastructure (predominantly its exploration and mining of rare minerals and natural gas). The USSR also sent contractors to build roads, hospitals and schools and to drill water wells; they also trained and equipped the Afghan army. In April 1978, the USSR delivered to Afghanistan free of charge 45 BTR-65 PB armored personnel carriers with ammunition; 26 combat radios for border troops; 10,000 Kalashnikov rifles (AK); and 5,000 Makarov pistols (PM) with ammunition, totalling about 6.3 million rubles.[11] Upon the PDPA's ascension to power, and the establishment of the DRA, the Soviet Union promised monetary aid amounting to at least $1.262 billion.


The destruction of Afghanistan's former ruling elite had begun immediately after the seizure of power. Execution (Parcham leaders later claimed at least 11,000 during the Taraki/Amin period), flight into exile, and later the devastation of Kabul itself would literally remove the great majority of the some 100,000 who had come to form Afghanistan's elite and middle class. Their loss almost completely broke the continuity of Afghanistan's leadership, political institutions and their social foundation. Karmal was dispatched to Czechoslovakia as ambassador, along with others shipped out of the country. Amin appeared to be the principal beneficiary of this strategy.
The Khalq leadership proved incapable of filling this vacuum. Its brutal and clumsy attempts to introduce radical changes in control over agricultural land holding and credit, rural social relations, marriage and family arrangements, and education led to scattered protests and uprisings among all major communities in the Afghan countryside. Taraki and Amin left a legacy of turmoil and resentment which gravely compromised later Marxist attempts to win popular acceptance.
The human rights violations of the Khalq extended beyond the educated elite. Between April 1978 and the Soviet invasion of December 1979, Afghan Communists executed an estimated 27,000 political prisoners at Pul-i-Charki prison six miles east of Kabul. Many of the victims were village mullahs and headmen who were obstructing the modernization and secularization of the intensely religious Afghan countryside. The Khalq leadership introduced to Afghanistan the "knock on the door in the middle of the night", previously little known in that country, where the central government usually lacked the power to enforce its will beyond Kabul.[12]
The Government was constructed in classic Leninist fashion. Until 1985 it was governed by a provisional constitution, "The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Supreme sovereignty was vested in a Revolutionary Council, originally a body of fifty-eight members whose number later varied. Its executive committee, the Presidium, exercised power when the council was not in formal session. The Revolutionary Council was presided over by the president of the Democratic Republic.
Beneath the council the cabinet functioned under a Prime Minister, essentially in a format inherited from the pre-Marxist era. Two new ministries were added: Islamic Affairs and Tribes and Nationalities. Administrative arrangements for provincial and sub-provincial government were also retained.
In Leninist style, the PDPA closely mirrored the formal instruments of government. Its authority was generated by its Central Committee, whose executive stand-in was its Politburo. Presiding over both was the party's secretary general. Policy generation was the primary function of the executive level of the party, which was to be carried out by its members serving throughout the government.
On 5 December 1978 a friendship treaty was signed with the Soviet Union and was later used as a pretext for the Soviet invasion. Major uprisings occurred regularly against the government led by members of the traditional establishment who lost their privileges in the land reform. The government responded with heavy-handed military reprisals and arrested, exiled and executed many Mujahideen "holy Muslim warriors". The Mujahideen belonged to various different factions, but all shared, to varying degrees, a similarly conservative 'Islamic' ideology.


On 15 February 1979, the United States ambassador in Kabul, Adolph Dubs, was taken hostage and later killed when Amin ordered the police to attack. The US did not appoint a new ambassador. The U.S. saw the situation as a prime opportunity to weaken the Soviet Union. As part of a Cold War strategy, in June 1979, the United States government (under President Jimmy Carter and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski) began to covertly fund and train anti-government Mujahideen forces through the Pakistani secret service known as Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), with the intention of provoking Soviet intervention, (according to Brzezinski).
In mid-March the 17th infantry division in Herat under the control of Ismail Khan mutinied in support of Shi'ite Muslims. A hundred Soviet advisors in the city, and their families, were killed. The city was bombed, causing massive destruction and thousands of deaths and later it was recaptured with Afghan army tanks and paratroopers.
Taraki visited Moscow on 20 March 1979 with a formal request for Soviet ground troops. Alexei Kosygin told him "we believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops... if our troops went in, the situation in your country... would get worse." Despite this statement Taraki negotiated some armed and humanitarian support—helicopter gunships with Soviet pilots and maintenance crews, 500 military advisors, 700 paratroopers disguised as technicians to defend Kabul airport, also significant food aid (300,000 tons of wheat). Brezhnev still warned Taraki that full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies—both yours and ours."
During this period, many Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran and began organizing a resistance movement. Although the groups organized, backed by the U.S. and Pakistan, in the city of Peshawar, Pakistan would after the Soviet invasion be described by the western press as "freedom fighters"—as if their goal were to establish a representative democracy in Afghanistan—in reality these groups each had agendas of their own that were often far from democratic. They were united, however, in their opposition to a regime with values very far from Islamic traditional ones, supported by external forces, as they were themselves in a far more direct manner.

The intense rivalry between Taraki and Amin within the Khalq faction heated up. Amin became prime minister on 28 March 1979 with Taraki remaining President. In September 1979, Taraki's followers had made several attempts on Amin's life. However, it was Taraki who was overthrown and assassinated by being smothered with a pillow in his bed, with Amin assuming power in Afghanistan. The Amin uprising was characterized as US-backed, with several reports of Amin meeting CIA agents in Kabul. Amin also began attempts to moderate what many Afghans viewed to be an anti-Islamic regime. His regime was still under pressure from the insurgency in the country and he tried to gain Pakistani or American support and refused to take Soviet advice. However, many Afghans held Amin responsible for the regime's harshest measures. The Soviet servicemen in Kabul speculated that Amin's rule would be marked by "harsh repression and... [result in] the activation and strengthening of the opposition... The situation can only be saved by the removal of Amin from power."
Taraki's death was first noted in the Kabul Times on 10 October, which reported that the former leader only recently hailed as the "great teacher... great genius... great leader" had died quietly "of serious illness, which he had been suffering for some time." Less than three months later, after the Amin government had been overthrown, the newly installed followers of Babrak Karmal gave another account of Taraki's death. According to this account, Amin ordered the commander of the palace guard to have Taraki executed. Taraki reportedly was suffocated with a pillow over his head. Amin's emergence from the power struggle within the small divided Communist party in Afghanistan alarmed the Soviets and would usher in the series of events which lead to the Soviet invasion.
In Kabul, the ascension of Amin to the top position was quick. Amin began unfinished attempts to moderate what many Afghans viewed to be an anti-Islamic regime. Promising more religious freedom, repairing mosques, presenting copies of the Qur'an to religious groups, invoking the name of Allah in his speeches, and declaring that the Saur Revolution was "totally based on the principles of Islam." Yet many Afghans held Amin responsible for the regime's harshest measures.
The Soviets established a special commission on Afghanistan, of KGB chairman Andropov, Ponomaryev from the Central Committee and Ustinov, the defense minister. In late October they reported that Amin was purging his opponents, including Soviet sympathizers; his loyalty to Moscow was false; and that he was seeking diplomatic links with Pakistan and possibly China.
[edit]Opposition forces

Outside observers usually identify the two warring groups as "fundamentalists" (or theocrats) and "traditionalists" (or monarchists). Rivalries between these groups continued during the Afghan civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal. The rivalries of these groups brought the plight of the Afghans to the attention of the West, and it was they who received military assistance from the United States and a number of other nations.
Since 1973 (nearly five years before the revolution) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani, future fundamentalist warlords and leaders of the fight against the Soviet army had fled to Peshawar, in Pakistan to build up support with the help of the Pakistani government. A number of camps, military in origin, may have been conceived as rallying points around specific warlords with strong fundamentalist leanings, not just as neutral gathering places for refugees. In 1977, the Pakistani dictator, General Zia-Ul-Haq enforced an Islamic constitution, and backed the Afghan warlords in Peshawar, financing the building of thousands of madrassas in the vicinity of refugee camps, with help from Saudi Arabia.[13]
The fundamentalists based their organizing principle around mass politics and included several divisions of the Jamiat-i-Islami. The leader of the parent branch, Rabbani, began organizing in Kabul before repression of religious conservatives, which began in 1974, forced him to flee to Pakistan during Daoud's regime. Perhaps best known among the leaders was Hekmatyar, who broke with Rabbani to form another resistance group, the Hizb-e-Islami, which became Pakistan's favoured arms recipient. Another split, engineered by Yunus Khales, resulted in a second group using the name Hizb-e-Islami—a group that was somewhat more moderate than Hikmatyar's. A fourth fundamentalist group was the Ittehad-i-Islami led by Abdul Rabb Rasuul al-Sayyaf, who would later invite Osama bin Laden to come to Afghanistan. Rabbani's group received its greatest support from northern Afghanistan where the best known resistance commander in Afghanistan—Massoud—a Tajik, like Rabbani, operated against the Soviets with considerable success.
The organizing principles of traditionalist groups differed from those of the fundamentalists. Formed from loose ties among ulama in Afghanistan, the traditionalist leaders were not concerned, unlike fundamentalists, with redefining Islam in Afghan society but instead focused on the use of the sharia as the source of law (interpreting the sharia is a principal role of the ulama). Among the three groups in Peshawar, the most important was the Jebh-e-Nejat-e-Milli led by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi. Some of the traditionalists were willing to accept restoration of the monarchy and looked to former King Mohammed Zahir Shah, exiled in Italy, as the ruler.
The traditionalist groups set about the active eradication of any kind of alternative secular opposition to Fundamentalist ideology, eliminating the dissident intellectuals—who also happened to oppose the Mujaheddin groups.
Other ties also were important in holding together some resistance groups. Among these were links within sufi orders, such as the Mahaz-e-Milli Islami, one of the traditionalist groups associated with the Gilani Sufi order led by Pir Sayyid Gilani. Another group, the Shia Muslims of Hazarajat, organized the refugees in Iran.
Funds of over $1 billion per year poured into the Mujahideen from the US, the Saudi intelligence service al-Istakhbara al-'Ama, the Kuwaitis, the Iraqis, the Libyans and the Iranians during the 1980s. The US-Saudi dominance in funding enabled them, along with the Pakistanis, to choose seven parties amongst the various exiled forces that leaned more towards theocratic despotism than toward secular nationalism.

No hace falta que repita lo que son unos comunistas luchando bajo los intereses de los Yankes y se merecen un gulag, por idiotas. Será mejor tener un jodido estado dominado por las fuerzas más reaccionrias financiadas por USA , integristas islamicos, que un gobierno "socialista revisionista" con EVIDENTES PROGRESOS , desde los cuales realizar una lucha posterior para conseguir la via adecuada ?

Esos comunistas que lucharon bajo bandera reaccionaria ...

Historical Overview of the Marxist Revolutionary Movement in Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Liberation Organization (ALO)

The Years of "Royal Democracy"

The first revolutionary Marxist organisation in Afghanistan was founded in 1966 under the name of Progressive Youth Organisation (PYO). The revisionist Moscow-directed "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" (PDPA) had been founded some time earlier by a number of intellectuals with suspicious links to a faction of the ruling elite. (Prince Daoud, cousin of King Zahir Shah and prime minister of Afghanistan [1953-1963] was dubbed "The Red Prince" because of his soft spot for the post-Stalin Soviet leadership; Babrak Karmal, one of the founding fathers of the PDPA and leader of the Parcham faction of this party was notorious as a Daoud informer and as a pander to Daoud's political ambitions.)

A salient characteristic of the revolutionary Marxist movement in Afghanistan since its very inception has been its unflagging struggle against revisionism and opportunism. It was in an anti-revisionist and anti-opportunist context that the revolutionary Marxist movement in Afghanistan was founded and grew up. Those early years were dominated by ideological polemics between the communist parties of the Soviet Union and China on the one hand and the Cultural Revolution in China on the other. Both political phenomena had indelible ideological and political effects on the PYO. It can very well be claimed that the PYO was founded as a necessary entity for defending and propagating revolutionary Marxism against the revisionism and collaborationism of the PDPA led by Noor Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal.

The winds of change were blowing in Afghanistan. In 1963 Daoud had to step down as prime minister in order to make way for King Zahir Shah to proclaim a constitutional monarchy. A new constitution was adopted and vestiges of democratic freedoms including a small measure of freedom of expression and freedom of the press was allowed to the people. Taking advantage of the thaw in the political climate, the PYO set out to publish a weekly mouthpiece, Sholai Jawaid [The Eternal Flame] which concentrated on introducing the principles of New Democracy (Mao Zedong Thought) and exposing the machinations of the PDPA and Soviet revisionism. Sholai Jawaid was banned after only 11 issues but that was enough to sow the seeds of revolutionary thought and to capture the hearts and minds of thousands of vanguard intellectuals and conscious workers.

The thaw in the political climate was appreciated by other political groupings also. Very soon political gatherings and demonstrations began to draw large numbers of adherents and to generate intense interest in Kabul and major towns. In most of such gatherings and demonstrations, three political currents were very visible: The Sholayis (as members, followers and sympathisers of the PYO came to be known after their mouthpiece Sholai Jawaid), the Khalqis and Parchamis (followers of the two rival factions of the PDPA, after their respective mouthpieces Khalq [The People] and Parcham [The Banner]), and the Ikhwanis (Islamists and Islamic fundamentalists, later renamed Moslem Youth, after the name of their prototype in Egypt -Ikhwan al-Muslimeen [Moslem Brotherhood]). From the point of view of numerical strength, the gatherings and demonstrations staged by the Sholayis in Kabul far outnumbered the Khalqis and Parchamis and completely dwarfed whatever the Ikhwanis could stage despite their claim on the religiosity and religious propensity of the general populace.

The Ikhwanis were initially not taken very seriously by political circles because of their inferior numbers and poor attraction for intellectuals. The Ikhwanis made up for their inferiority by their virulence, which first manifested itself by a spate of acid spraying onto the faces of young university and high school girl students. (This was motivated by Islamic fundamentalist misogyny which abhors the appearance of women in society and considers life-incarceration of women in houses and harems as the acme of Islamic piety.) This Ikhwani virulence grew by leaps and bounds and very soon reached the point of bloodthirsty murders of secular-minded intellectuals. A number of such murders were overtly committed by the Ikhwanis in Herat and Laghman and many covert cases of Ikhwani murders came to light in Kabul and other cities. The climax for the revolutionary Marxist movement came in June 1972 when Sholayis and Ikhwanis clashed on the campus of Kabul University, a hotbed of ideological and political struggle and debate. True to their nature, the Ikhwanis had come armed with knives and pistols. The situation on that fateful day quickly got out of hand and Saydal Sokhandan, a prominent PYO activist and fiery Sholayi orator was personally assassinated by Golbuddin Hekmatyar who later gained notoriety as the leader of the most rabid Islamic fundamentalist grouping, the Hizb-i-Islami [Islamic Party]. (It was this Hizb-i-Islami which got the lion's share of the CIA largesse during the years of the War of Resistance against Soviet aggression and occupation; like all Afghan fundamentalist parties the Hizb-i-Islami was nurtured on CIA arms and dollars until from a lowly jackal it grew into a bloodthirsty hyena, feasting on the entrails of the people of Afghanistan. This one fact alone is enough to expose the hypocritical howls of Western imperialism against Islamic fundamentalism.) Many other Sholayis were wounded, some of them critically. This clash further polarised the general political atmosphere and generated intense debate within the PYO, forcing an introspection into its policies and approaches.

The prevailing criticism amongst the Sholayis was that despite the fact that the Sholai Jawaid political current had amassed a large and dedicated following of thousands of young Afghans, the leadership of the PYO had been unable to harness the potential of these adherents for the political mobilisation of the peasant masses who comprised 90% of the people of Afghanistan. The outreach of the PYO and its leadership rarely extended beyond the urban intelligentsia, urbanites and a limited number of workers. It was in consequence of such introspection that at the beginning of the 70s different circles within the Sholai Jawaid political current began highlighting the mistakes of the PYO and opened up an extensive ideological struggle at all levels of the organisation. The most profound criticism of the PYO came from the Revolutionary Group of the Peoples of Afghanistan (later upgraded and renamed Sazman-i Rehayi Afghanistan [Afghanistan Liberation Organisation]). The totality of such criticisms resulted in the dissolution of the PYO into a number of smaller revolutionary groupings generally adhering - with different degrees of disagreement -- to Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought.

The Daoud years

In July 1973 Daoud, the "Red Prince", supported by the Parcham faction of the PDPA, staged a bloodless coup d'état in which he ousted his cousin King Zahir Shah and proclaimed Afghanistan a republic with himself as the president. Daoud's Parchami cronies got appointed to key government posts, but the Parchamis and their Russian masters had underrated Daoud's famous self-willed bull-headedness. After a year of Parchami mismanagement and misdemeanour at all levels and their pursuance of a hidden agenda dictated by Moscow, Daoud sacked all key Parchami office bearers in his administration. This obliged Moscow to concentrate on the Afghan armed forces for the achievement of its ulterior motives. During Daoud's 5-year rule as president (1973-1978) the revolutionary movement remained in a state of stagnation. This was due to disunity amongst former members and followers of the now-dissolved PYO. The Revolutionary Group of the Peoples of Afghanistan (the precursor of the ALO) emerged as one of the few well-organised revolutionary groups having a clear agenda. It laid stress (with hindsight, perhaps overstress) on the need for more in-depth work with the peasantry and most of its cadres and activists shifted their activities to the rural scene.

During this period the two rival factions of the PDPA (the Khalq faction led by Noor Mohammad Taraki and the Parcham faction led by Babrak Karmal) who had split some years ago in consequence of a personality clash between Taraki and Karmal were reunited in 1977 under strict orders from Moscow. This was in preparation for the implementation of strategic plans hatched in the Kremlin for a Russian version of 19th century colonial Britain's "forward policy". Daoud had in the meantime become disillusioned with his Kremlin sponsors and had turned to the West for help in his ambitious development plans. He mended fences with Pakistan (a long dispute with Pakistan over "Pashtunistan" was Daoud's favourite foreign policy quarrel) and visited Iran and Saudi Arabia to solicit financial assistance. Daoud's about-face was too abrupt and too alarming for Kremlin strategists to brook any delay in a swift, decisive counteraction. (Memories of Anwar Sadat and Mohmmad Siyad Barre's booting out of the Russians from Egypt and Somalia a few years earlier were still too fresh and too painful). In April 1978 the KGB engineered the assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber, a key Parchami figure, and had the unified PDPA stage a massive show of strength and defiance at his funeral. This was orchestrated in order to provoke Daoud into a crackdown on the PDPA. The arrogant Daoud fell into the trap and triggered an armed backlash spearheaded by KGB moles in key army and airforce units. The "Glorious Saur Revolution" was on. The bloody ensuing coup d'état of April 28, 1978, resulted in the massacre of Daoud and his entire family along with an estimated 7,000 military and civilian population and the coming to power of the PDPA with Noor Mohammad Taraki as president and prime minister and Babrak Karmal as his deputy. At this juncture in time Afghan revolutionary groupings were not a recognisable political force, but the correctness of their political appraisal of the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist power and of the PDPA as an agent of high treason and a mole of social-imperialism, and the Sholayis' oft-repeated refrain trying to bring home the need for unrelenting struggle against master and lackey did not fail to register itself on the minds and conscience of thinking and feeling patriots.

The "Saur" years

Neither the people of Afghanistan nor revolutionary groupings were sorry to see Daoud fall, but this did not prevent all revolutionary Marxist groupings --the political heirs of the PYO-- from swiftly, unequivocally and unanimously condemning the bloody coup d'état and calling on the people to rally to save the motherland from the fate that awaited her at the hands of the sold-out PDPA arch-traitors and their Russian masters. This swift and clear response was based on the fact that no revolutionary Marxist individual or grouping in Afghanistan had the slightest doubt that the indigenous Khalqi and Parchami lackeys of Soviet revisionism had any role or mission in Afghanistan other than to sell out their country to the Soviet Union under the guise of the touted "non-capitalist road to development" and to safeguard at all costs the interests of the Soviets in Afghanistan. Immediately after the "victory of the Saur Revolution" a nightmarish reign of terror was unleashed on the broad populace in general and on dissident intelligentsia in particular. Arbitrary individual and mass arrests, horrendous torture of suspects and mass executions of all "counter-revolutionary" elements arrested on the slightest pretext by hysterically obsessed functionaries commissioned by a frantically paranoid coterie of KGB agents at the helm of the state and government became commonplace and routine. None were spared. For the Khalqi parvenus (they very soon fell out with the Parchamis and, gaining the upper hand, turned on their erstwhile comrades-in-arms; under the aegis of Alexandre Puzanov, the Soviet ambassador, Babrak Karmal and his retinue of key Parchamis were banished abroad but a number of them were clapped into prison) anyone and everyone uttering a word against the Soviet Union and the "Saur Revolution" were traitors and counter-revolutionaries and all counter-revolutionaries were either "Sholayis" (if they were educated and secular-minded) or "Ikhwanis" (if they were illiterate, uncouth and/or religious-minded). Between these two categories, the harsher and crueller treatment was meted out to the "Sholayis" for they were "conscious enemies" with pre-meditated political motives for antagonism and animosity against "the achievements of the Glorious Saur Revolution" as opposed to "ignorant enemies" who opposed the "Saur Revolution" out of thoughtless religious fanaticism. Not in words but in deeds the regime lashed out at the religiosity of the masses, misreading the ABC of historical materialism and Marxist sociology. All this was perpetrated in the name of "democratic revolution", "people's democracy as the first rung on the ladder to socialism" and "the abrogation of exploitation of man by man". All concepts that were hallowed and venerable for workers, the exploited classes and the toiling masses were rendered profane and despicable, epitomising terror, treachery and "red villainy". Irreparable damage was done in the name of "revolution" to the image of true revolutionary intellectuals and workers and revolutionary concepts.

Galvanised by the universal atmosphere of terror, dismay and tragedy and the awareness of much worse and much more serious to come, groupings of revolutionary Marxists began to draw together again and in some cases reached some degrees of unification, but under the prevailing circumstances such unification had little practical results. However, each revolutionary grouping, spurred by the same relentless circumstances to becoming more organised and to evolving into Marxist organisations, were -each in its own way and according to its available means and capabilities- engaged in deepening and expanding the patriotic struggle. On August 5, 1979, the Revolutionary Group of the Peoples of Afghanistan (precursor of the ALO) collaborating in a united front with a number of militant Islamist organisations participated in a military uprising in the Bala Hissar garrison in Kabul (popularly remembered as the Bala Hissar insurrection). The insurrection was savagely quashed by the regime and a large number of Revolutionary Group cadres were killed in the fighting, succumbed under torture or were summarily executed. The correctness of the policy and line of action taken by the Revolutionary Group in forming a united front with Islamists and participating in a military uprising is still debated in Afghan Marxist circles, but as mentioned in an ALO document, the 5th August insurrection showed that Marxist patriots did not flinch from being in the first line of battle when defence of the people and independence of the motherland were at stake, and that seas of blood separate the Sholayis from Khalqi and Parchami revisionist traitors.

For Afghan Marxist revolutionaries it was a foregone conclusion that in the light of the outright rejection of the regime by the people and the regime's increasing failure in all aspects of governance the Soviet Union would have to step in to safeguard its strategic interests. As was expected, the PDPA regime very quickly degenerated into a mêlée of party top dogs going for each other's throats with Alexandre Puzanov, the Soviet ambassador and veteran spymaster, acting both as patron and referee. Hafizullah Amin, Taraki's unscrupulous and megalomaniacally ambitious lieutenant in the Khalq faction very soon turned the Khalqis on the Parchamis and had the Parchami top brass banished and some of them handed over to the dreaded omnipotent AGSA secret police for "investigation". Soon afterwards he turned on his mentor, Taraki, and, in a dramatic scene strongly reminiscent of New York mafiosi settling scores, there was a shoot-out in the presidential palace in the presence of the Soviet ambassador. The Soviet godfather had given the Kremlin's tacit blessings to Taraki to have the egotistical Amin annihilated, but the plan went awry and Amin managed to escape unscathed while his trusted aide-de-camp Daoud Taroon was killed. This was the last straw. Amin had Taraki peremptorily arrested and assumed all his official titles. A couple of days later Taraki, the "Great Leader", the "Prodigy of the East", was smothered to death on orders of his "loyal pupil" and "devout disciple" Amin. Amin was now at the top and was effusive in his frequent eulogies of the Soviet Union, but he couldn't fool the Soviets. He had foiled the Kremlin's plans, had considerably embarrassed Moscow and had kicked out the Soviet old hand in political intrigue in Afghanistan who was present when he had his close call. But Moscow had taken pains to have spares. It now lifted a finger and Parchami bigwigs banished as ambassadors to different countries by the Khalqis scurried to receive their orders. On December 27, 1979, Babrak Karmal went on the air from a radio station in the then Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic dissembling Radio Afghanistan and announced the inauguration of the "new and evolutionary stage of the Glorious Saur Revolution". Amin had on that day been poisoned by his Russian guards in his palace in Kabul and "limited contingents" of the Soviet army poured into Afghanistan with Babrak Karmal perched on the barrel of their tanks. The former informer of Prince Daoud and the KGB's ace spook was now at the helm.

The War of Resistance

The worst had come to pass. The homeland of a fanatically independent people had been occupied by a foreign invader and a despised quisling had been foisted on them at gunpoint as their ruler. The people flew to arms, often nothing better than kitchen knives or rusty 19th century firearms. For the revolutionary Marxist movement in Afghanistan it was a time of great tribulation. A fledgling movement which had not yet completely found it bearings and had not yet even teethed was saddled with the formidable challenge of putting its mark on a national liberation struggle against a superpower armed to the teeth. This was a country still in the throes of semi-feudal relations of production struggling with a primitive agricultural economy and an illiteracy rate of over 90% and, of course, deeply religious. The sacred sovereignty of such a people had been scandalously betrayed by "Marxists" and the integrity of such a country had been rudely violated by the country Lenin had built. Social-imperialism had struck home. The Afghan people's concept of honour and the totality of their world outlook, encapsulated in their religious faith, had been battered and insulted. The masses were crying out for the blood of the atheist "communist" traitors. In such an atmosphere a fledgling revolutionary Marxist movement was expected to perform its historical mission.

Afghanistan is the homeland of different ethnic groups who due to the under-development of productive forces have not yet been completely fused into one nation in the strict sense of the word. The same factors which have prevented the people of Afghanistan from becoming a modern nation have for more than a millennium conditioned them to look to their Islamic religious belief as the one unifying agent of all social classes and all ethnic denominations, particularly in times of historical adversity. With the coming to power of the quisling PDPA and particularly after the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the call for a Jihad --a Holy War-- began to be echoed from all corners of the country's plains and valleys. As against the British in the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, this was the only way a people barely out of the Middle Ages, both spiritually and materially, could articulate the need for a patriotic war of resistance against an alien invader. Only Jihad could provide a burning motivation, a simple and well-understood ideological elucidation of the need and duty of giving up life and limb in an all-out concerted effort to rid the country from the defilement of indigenous traitors and their alien masters. Amid the cacophony of Islamic exhortations to a Jihad after the pro-Soviet coup d'état and particularly after the Soviet invasion, Islamic fundamentalist merchants of faith were reaping gold.

The Ikhwanis had made a bid for power during Daoud's fateful years. Theirs was an exercise in folly as no segment of the Afghan society supported their feeble insurrections in Laghman and Panjsher. Most of their leaders were rounded up and put in jail and a number of them took refuge in neighbouring Pakistan where they offered their services to the intelligence agencies of the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. They were put on modest payrolls and put away for a rainy day. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the wakening up of Western imperialism to this chance of getting even with its social-imperialist rival after the humiliating defeat of the US in Vietnam, they were brought out of the closet and made into leaders overnight. The deity must have been smiling down on them as the wily secular-minded Bhutto had been deposed by his Islamist Chief of Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq, and the US arms-and-money pipeline and Arab petrodollars began pouring in. Inflated with US and Arab arms and money and surfing on a high tide of popular anti-Soviet religious sentiment, the fundamentalist small-time paid agents burst onto the political scene as leaders of the Afghan Mujahedin freedom fighters, and by extension, leaders of the people of Afghanistan. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the murderer of Saydal Sokhandan in bygone years, rose to stardom by dint of his political acumen, cruel, unscrupulous nature and shameless obsequiousness to Pakistani generals and bigwigs charged with dispensing US and Arab arms and dollars. He had not forgotten old animosities. He declared the Sholayis, as true revolutionaries, to be "the principal enemy" and more than at a par with the Khalqis and Parchamis. In the words of a revolutionary Afghan writer:

"The revolutionary movement in Afghanistan was pitted not only against the Soviet aggressors. The Khomeini regime in Iran and the Zia-ul-Haq dictatorship in Pakistan saw eye-to-eye and worked shoulder-to-shoulder with the Russians and the puppet regime in Kabul in decimating Marxist revolutionaries in Afghanistan and nullifying their work amongst the masses. Our fledgling revolutionary movement was under siege from all four directions."

Hundreds of Afghan revolutionary Marxists were executed in the Polygon killing fields of Pol-i-Charkhy in Kabul during the Taraki-Amin period and later on during the Karmal and Najibullah years of Soviet occupation. Hundreds more were hunted down by Ikhwani parties in Pakistan and inside Afghanistan. The Khad secret services (the Afghan arm of the KGB) had a special section mandated with the task of annihilating all Sholayi organisations and groupings. The Sholayis were fighting against impossible odds. On the one hand they were duty bound to participate in the national liberation struggle, whether Jihad or War of Resistance, and on the other they had to fight off the KGB on one side and the Ikhwani bloodhounds on the other side. Yet participate in the national liberation struggle they did. The Afghanistan Liberation Organisation (the former Revolutionary Group of the Peoples of Afghanistan) and the Afghanistan People's Liberation Organisation (SAMA) are two revolutionary organisations which have actively and tangibly participated in the War of Resistance. At one time SAMA even had liberated areas of its own. With such prominent presence in the national liberation struggle it was too much not to expect rabid Ikhwani reaction. The Islamists did not spare any Sholayi falling into their hands and spared no effort at getting at prominent comrades of the revolutionary movement. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami was the top bloodhound in hunting down Marxist revolutionaries. Many an intrepid revolutionary and many a stalwart patriot was gunned down or made to disappear without a trace in Peshawar, Pakistan, centre of resistance political and logistical activities. Comrade Dr Faiz Ahmad, veteran of the Marxist movement in Afghanistan and founding leader of the Revolutionary Group of the Peoples of Afghanistan and subsequently of the ALO was handed over to the Hizb-i-Islami by a traitor commissioned by the Hizb, and tortured to death. Tens of other ALO cadres and comrades were assassinated by the Hizb-i-Islami. It is a well known fact that Prof. Qayum Rahbar, leader of SAMA, was gunned down by Hizb-i-Islami hit men in Peshawar, although SAMA --for reasons of their own-- have not yet documented this fact. Throughout the years of Russian occupation (by an irony of fate coinciding with the Zia-ul-Haq years in Pakistan) Afghan fundamentalist parties in general and Hizb-i-Islami in particular enjoyed highly privileged status afforded them by the Zia-ul-Haq regime. The resources of the Pakistan armed forces, intelligence services, police and the fundamentalist Jamaat-i Islami Pakistan party were all at the ready disposal of the Afghan fundamentalists, therefore Afghan revolutionaries and secular patriots had no refuge and no recourse to even a modicum of support or sympathy from the Pakistani authorities. By extension, they were deprived of any and all recognition and acknowledgement by the world media.

. . . Upto the present

The unsung and unnoticed revolutionary Marxist movement in Afghanistan, battered to nigh extinction from right and left, is outstanding by its resilience. The almost totality of its leaders and the absolute majority of its cadres and veterans have been decimated by either the Khalqis and Parchamis or by the Ikhwanis. Yet by the fiat of history the Marxist revolutionary movement is alive and immortal. The incredibly overpowering circumstances of the years of the War of Resistance compelled true communists to adopt tactics apposite to the situation. One such tactic was to infiltrate the ranks of belligerent reactionary Islamist parties and organisations at the grassroot level with the intention of authenticating their unseverable bond with the masses and acquiring arms and ammunition for revolutionary forces. A lasting monument to the contribution of revolutionary Marxists to the people's War of Resistance against Soviet aggression is the fact that the names "Sholayis" and "Sholai Jawaid" have not been drowned out by fourteen years of thunderous Islamist stridency in a war which was never allowed by the Islamists to be labelled as anything but a war of Islam against atheism and communism. The prestige of Marxist revolutionaries has been enhanced by their active presence in frontlines of battle and the authentication of their personalities as intrepid, caring and popular individuals informed in military issues and evincing insight and discernment in political analyses. The known irreconcilability of revolutionary Marxists groupings and organisations with the puppet regime (notwithstanding the emergence of a few traitorous and capitulating elements amongst them) has greatly contributed to the growth of the revolutionaries' prestige amongst the masses and amongst honest elements of the Islamist opposition. One very orthodox Muslim compatriot is on record as saying, "I am and always have been inimical towards the Sholayis but I do not for a moment doubt their patriotism and their love for the people."

The War of Resistance against Soviet social-imperialism is over and the people of Afghanistan can rightfully claim the laurels of victory. Social-imperialism has been sent to its rightful place in the dustbin of history and classical Western imperialism is sure to follow suit sooner or later. But it is the historical misfortune of the people of Afghanistan that after giving the fatal mauling to the social-imperialist bear it now has to fend off rabid reactionary hyenas, the chained dogs of Western imperialism. As with the national liberation war of resistance against social-imperialism, the ALO shall continue to stand in the forefront of the battle with fundamentalist beasts.

The true communist movement in Afghanistan is beset by innumerable deficiencies, foremost amongst which are theoretical ambiguity and a concomitant organisational confusion; and is severely constrained in its political-awareness disseminating tasks. But it has amassed rich experience in combat activities and in work amongst the masses. Afghan revolutionary Marxists have become veterans in armed engagements with the enemy. Should it ever become possible for revolutionary Afghan Marxists to combine this fighting experience with a deeper understanding of class contradictions in Afghan society, with increased class consciousness of both its members and the toiling masses, and with the enjoyment of deeper trust of a people fatally betrayed in the name of Marxism-Leninism by social-imperialist stooges, history shall surely witness dramatic changes in the political arena in Afghanistan. The depth and breadth of the ignominy and savagery of the current Islamic fundamentalist rule in Afghanistan is unprecedented in contemporary world history, as is the devastation inflicted on the moral and material fabric of the country and the people. Not the fundamentalist but the ultra-fundamentalist beast is now worrying what is left of the living skin and bones of the Afghan people. What the world is witnessing in Afghanistan at the present juncture in time is ultra-reactionary religious fascism, mass gender apartheid and ultra-fundamentalism all rolled into one. Such unprecedented mediaeval tyranny is and shall be matched by the resilience, heroism and faith of true Afghan communists in their historical mission to deliver their country and people from the current inferno and to lead the toiling masses to a society free from the shackles of feudalism and the capitalist exploitation of the many by the few. This alone is sufficient to ensure that such an anachronistic political monstrosity cannot and should not live long. History shall always find the ALO at its post.

Galvanised by the universal atmosphere of terror, dismay and tragedy and the awareness of much worse and much more serious to come, groupings of revolutionary Marxists began to draw together again and in some cases reached some degrees of unification, but under the prevailing circumstances such unification had little practical results. However, each revolutionary grouping, spurred by the same relentless circumstances to becoming more organised and to evolving into Marxist organisations, were -each in its own way and according to its available means and capabilities- engaged in deepening and expanding the patriotic struggle. On August 5, 1979, the Revolutionary Group of the Peoples of Afghanistan (precursor of the ALO) collaborating in a united front with a number of militant Islamist organisations participated in a military uprising in the Bala Hissar garrison in Kabul (popularly remembered as the Bala Hissar insurrection). The insurrection was savagely quashed by the regime and a large number of Revolutionary Group cadres were killed in the fighting, succumbed under torture or were summarily executed. The correctness of the policy and line of action taken by the Revolutionary Group in forming a united front with Islamists and participating in a military uprising is still debated in Afghan Marxist circles, but as mentioned in an ALO document, the 5th August insurrection showed that Marxist patriots did not flinch from being in the first line of battle when defence of the people and independence of the motherland were at stake, and that seas of blood separate the Sholayis from Khalqi and Parchami revisionist traitors.

La intervención de la CIA en Afganistán

Entrevista con Zbigniew Brzezinski,
asesor de Seguridad Nacional del presidente Jimmy Carter

Le Nouvel Observateur, París, 15-21 enero, 1998
Publicado en globalresearch.ca 15 de octubre 2001

Pregunta: El ex director de la CIA, Robert Gates, declaró en sus memorias ["From the Shadows"], que los servicios de inteligencia norteamericanos comenzaron a ayudar a los muyahidines en Afganistán 6 meses antes de la intervención soviética. En este período fueron el asesor de seguridad nacional del presidente Carter. Por lo tanto, jugó un papel en este asunto. ¿Es correcto?

Brzezinski: Sí. Según la versión oficial de la historia, la ayuda de la CIA a los muyaidines empezó en 1980, es decir, después de que el ejército soviético invadiera Afganistán el 24 de diciembre de 1979. Pero la realidad, secretamente guardada hasta ahora, es completamente diferente De hecho, el 3 de julio de 1979 que el presidente Carter firmó la primera directiva para la ayuda secreta a los opositores al régimen pro-soviético en Kabul. Y ese mismo día, escribí una nota al presidente en la que le expliqué que en mi opinión esta ayuda iba a provocar una intervención militar soviética.

Q: A pesar de este riesgo, usted era un defensor de esta acción clandestina. Pero tal vez te desea esta entrada soviética en la guerra y parecía que lo provoque?

B: Realmente no es eso. No empujamos a los rusos a intervenir, pero aumentamos a sabiendas la probabilidad de que lo harían.

Q: Cuando los soviéticos justificaron su intervención afirmando que tenían la intención de luchar contra una implicación secreta de Estados Unidos en Afganistán, la gente no les creyó. Sin embargo, había una base de verdad. No me arrepiento de nada hoy en día?

B: ¿Lamentar qué? Esa operación secreta fue una excelente idea. Tuvo el efecto de atraer a los rusos a la trampa afgana ¿y usted quiere que lo lamente? El día que los soviéticos cruzaron oficialmente la frontera, le escribí al presidente Carter. Ahora tenemos la oportunidad de dar a la URSS su guerra de Vietnam. De hecho, durante casi 10 años, Moscú tuvo que llevar a cabo una guerra insostenible por el gobierno, un conflicto que llevó a la desmoralización y finalmente la ruptura de la del imperio soviético.

Q: ¿Y tampoco lamenta haber apoyado al fundamentalismo islámico, haber dado armas y asesoramiento a los futuros terroristas?

B: ¿Qué es más importante para la historia del mundo? Los talibanes o el colapso del imperio soviético? Algunos revuelto musulmanes o la liberación de Europa Central y el fin de la guerra fría?

Q: Algunas agitado por los musulmanes? Pero se ha dicho y el fundamentalismo islámico representa una repetida amenaza el mundo de hoy.

B: ¡Tonterías! Se dice que Occidente había una política global en relación con el Islam. Eso es una estupidez. No hay un Islam global. Mira el Islam de una manera racional y sin demagogia o emoción. Es la religión más importantes del mundo con 1,5 millones de seguidores. Pero ¿qué hay en común entre el fundamentalismo saudí, Marruecos moderada, el militarismo de Pakistán, el secularismo Egipto Asia pro-occidental o central? Nada más que lo que une a los países cristianos.

Traducido del francés por Bill Blum

Osea, que en definitiva,¿ me estas defendiendo que se luche bajo la bandera de las filas del Imperialismo yanke ? ¿ Eres consicnete de esta barbaridad ? Lo repito ¿ Me defiendes que comunistas luchen en las filas de las tropas financiadas y manejadas por la CIA en la invasión de playa Girón ? ¿ Me defiendes luchar contra los Cubanos en la Guerra de Angola en las filas de los Imperialistas de SudAfrica y el Aparheid ?

¿ tambien veriamos a estos protentos del comunismo luchando en las filas del imperialismo yanke y los pitiyankes contra el revisionista Hugo Chavez ?

On April 27, 1978, former Vice General Commander of Afghan Air Force, Wing Commander Abdul Qadir, who held pro-Moscow stand, undertook a coup d'etat, ousted the Daud government and set up "the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan". The Revolutionary Council was established as the highest authority of the country. Mr. Noor Mohammad Taraki, Chairman of the People's Democratic Party became Chairman of the Council and Prime Minister of the government. The new government of Afghanistan sent a memorandum to the Chinese Embassy in Kabul on April 30 and a verbal note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry on May 3 demanding China's recognition of the Afghan government. With a view to further developing the friendly relations between the two countries and two peoples, the Chinese Foreign Ministry replied with a verbal note on May 7 to extend recognition to the new government of Afghanistan. However, soon after this, the Afghan government started to carry out a pro-Soviet Union and anti-China policy by throwing in its own lot with Soviet Union and conducting anti-China activities. Afghanistan also expressed its dissatisfaction to China's establishment of diplomatic ties with the USA.

Within the PRC there was also opposition from left-wing elements. This effort was allegedly led by Lin Biao, head of the military, who died in a mysterious plane crash over Mongolia while trying to defect to the Soviet Union. His death silenced most internal dissent over the visit.

Both China and the United States backed combatants in Africa against Soviet and Cuban-supported movements. The economic benefits of normalization were slow as it would take decades for American products to penetrate the vast Chinese market. While Nixon's China policy is regarded by many as the highlight of his presidency, others such as William Bundy have argued that it provided very little benefit to the United States.

Liaison Office, 1973–1978
In May 1973, in an effort to build toward formal diplomatic relations, the US and the PRC established the United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart PRC office in Washington, DC. In the years between 1973 and 1978, such distinguished Americans as David K. E. Bruce, George H. W. Bush, Thomas S. Gates, and Leonard Woodcock served as chiefs of the USLO with the personal rank of Ambassador.
President Gerald Ford visited the PRC in 1975 and reaffirmed American interest in normalizing relations with Beijing. Shortly after taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter again reaffirmed the goals of the Shanghai Communiqué. Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and senior staff member of the National Security Council Michel Oksenberg encouraged Carter to seek full diplomatic and trade relations with China. Brzezinkski and Oksenberg traveled to Beijing in early 1978 to work with Leonard Woodcock, then head of the liaison office, to lay the groundwork to do so. The United States and the People's Republic of China announced on December 15, 1978 that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979

In February 1979, the Afghan government delivered a statement condemning China invading Viet Nam. In March, the Afghan government issued another communique accusing China of sending officers to train Afghan guerrillas and providing arms and financial assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In April, the Afghan media including its newspaper and broadcasting vilified China by alleging that China had trained Afghan "anti-revolutionary elements". The Chinese Foreign Ministry as well as the Chinese Embassy in Kabul made a number of presentations to the Afghan authorities to expose their lies and clarify the truth of events. The Sino-Afghan friendly relations had thus been severely damaged.

On December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Chinese government issued an official statement on December 30 strongly condemning the Soviet Union's armed invasion into Afghanistan. China did not recognize the Karmal regime in Afghanistan which was propped up by the Soviet Union. Therefore, China retained its Embassy in Afghanistan (at the level of Charge d'affaires a.i.), which, however, bore no official relation with the Afghan regime, except some routine work and consular and visa functions.

leooonidas escribió:

Osea, que en definitiva,¿ me estas defendiendo que se luche bajo la bandera de las filas del Imperialismo yanke ? ¿ Eres consicnete de esta barbaridad ? Lo repito ¿ Me defiendes que comunistas luchen en las filas de las tropas financiadas y manejadas por la CIA en la invasión de playa Girón ? ¿ Me defiendes luchar contra los Cubanos en la Guerra de Angola en las filas de los Imperialistas de SudAfrica y el Aparheid ?

¿ tambien veriamos a estos protentos del comunismo luchando en las filas del imperialismo yanke y los pitiyankes contra el revisionista Hugo Chavez ?

Yo te recomiendo leer antes de seguir diciendo lo mismo de siempre.

Si vieras como han sido la realidad el contexto en que les toco luchar a los comunistas afganos te medirias en tus palabras sobre que lucharon bajo interes yanquis. Yo no se de donde te sale esas ideas, el justificar la invasion hace alusinar.

Yo solo te recomiendo leer el documento.

Otra cosa no puedo hacer por ti.

Saludos.

El carácter revolucionario del movimiento nacional, en las condiciones de la opresión imperialista, no presupone forzosamente, ni mucho menos, la existencia de elementos proletarios en el movimiento, la existencia de un programa revolucionario o republicano del movimiento, la existencia en éste de una base democrática. La lucha del emir de Afganistán por la independencia de su país es una lucha objetivamente revolucionaria, a pesar de las ideas monárquicas del emir y de sus partidarios, porque esa lucha debilita al imperialismo, lo descompone, lo socava.

En el Tíbet no se han implantado las reformas democráticas debido a que allí las condiciones no están todavía maduras. Según el Acuerdo de Diecisiete Puntos, concertado entre el Gobierno Popular Central y el gobierno local del Tíbet, la reforma del sistema social debe realizarse, pero el momento de emprenderla sólo podrá ser decidido cuando la gran mayoría de las masas tibetanas y sus personalidades dirigentes lo consideren factible. En cuanto a este particular no debe haber precipitación. Por ahora se ha decidido no efectuar reformas democráticas en el Tíbet durante el Segundo Plan Quinquenal. La cuestión de si éstas serán introducidas durante el Tercer Plan Quinquenal se decidirá a la luz de la situación de entonces.

SS-18, bonita forma de joder hilos. Puede que eso te sirva con novatos que al ver tanto texto copi-pegado desistan pero conmigo no te va a funcionar.

Shenin, te vuelvo a repetir que lo que comentas está relacionado con las luchas entre las facciones del PDP. La facción Khalq era la menos prosoviética y la más “revolucionaria”, en el sentido de que era la que más reformas tenían pensado llevar a cabo. Mientras que Parcham era la facción más moderada y más prosoviética y la URSS no interviene hasta que esta facción toma el poder.

Respecto al campesinado pobre el problema no está en la posición que debían adoptar ante ellos porque en una revolución democrática el campesinado tiene que participar. La cuestión es que en Afganistán no hubo ninguna revolución sino un golpe de Estado que intentó implementar reformas desde arriba sin contar con la inmensa mayoría de la población y así acabaron.

Respecto a la cuestión de la resistencia en parte ya contesto en el comentario a SS-18. La lucha del emir de Afganistán también solo socavaba al imperialismo británico y no al imperialismo alemán o japonés, entre otros. La única forma de socavar al imperialismo en conjunto es mediante la realización de la revolución proletaria, de lo contrario solo lucharán contra uno o varios Estados imperialistas en concreto mientras apoyan a otros Estados imperialistas.

Los comunistas siempre deben apoyar a los pueblos del mundo por su independencia nacional fuese esta en detrimento de los EE UU o de la URSS o por muy reaccionarios que fuesen los dirigentes de dicha resistencia.

cpablo escribió:Ahora me queda solo una duda
¿Qué tendría que haber hecho la URSS para terminar con la guerra civil?

SS-18 escribió:Y veamos donde vienen estos problemas :

On April 27, 1978, former Vice General Commander of Afghan Air Force, Wing Commander Abdul Qadir, who held pro-Moscow stand, undertook a coup d'etat, ousted the Daud government and set up "the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan". The Revolutionary Council was established as the highest authority of the country. Mr. Noor Mohammad Taraki, Chairman of the People's Democratic Party became Chairman of the Council and Prime Minister of the government. The new government of Afghanistan sent a memorandum to the Chinese Embassy in Kabul on April 30 and a verbal note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry on May 3 demanding China's recognition of the Afghan government. With a view to further developing the friendly relations between the two countries and two peoples, the Chinese Foreign Ministry replied with a verbal note on May 7 to extend recognition to the new government of Afghanistan. However, soon after this, the Afghan government started to carry out a pro-Soviet Union and anti-China policy by throwing in its own lot with Soviet Union and conducting anti-China activities. Afghanistan also expressed its dissatisfaction to China's establishment of diplomatic ties with the USA.

Osea, que los problemas entre Afganistan-China comienzan cuando el primero, denuncia las relaciones "secretas" entre China y USA. Lo que supuestaemnte es el motivo por el cual  el gobierno de Afganistan se posiciona hacia la URSS a partir del 71.

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Within the PRC there was also opposition from left-wing elements. This effort was allegedly led by Lin Biao, head of the military, who died in a mysterious plane crash over Mongolia while trying to defect to the Soviet Union. His death silenced most internal dissent over the visit.

Lin Biao, el oficla de mayor rango del Ejercito, muere en un "accidente de avion", se dice que pretendia huir a la URSS.

Both China and the United States backed combatants in Africa against Soviet and Cuban-supported movements. The economic benefits of normalization were slow as it would take decades for American products to penetrate the vast Chinese market. While Nixon's China policy is regarded by many as the highlight of his presidency, others such as William Bundy have argued that it provided very little benefit to the United States.

Anda, China y USA  que gozan de unas relaciones diplomaticas de ensueño ( que raro, comunistas y los anticomunistas más radicales como Bzerzsinski de la mano )financian y apoyan a combatientes, contra los socialfascistasimperialistas y sus colonias, es decir, Sovieticos y Cubanos!!! Ya cada vez parece que entiendo más lo que paso en Afganistan.

Liaison Office, 1973–1978
In May 1973, in an effort to build toward formal diplomatic relations, the US and the PRC established the United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart PRC office in Washington, DC. In the years between 1973 and 1978, such distinguished Americans as David K. E. Bruce, George H. W. Bush, Thomas S. Gates, and Leonard Woodcock served as chiefs of the USLO with the personal rank of Ambassador.
President Gerald Ford visited the PRC in 1975 and reaffirmed American interest in normalizing relations with Beijing. Shortly after taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter again reaffirmed the goals of the Shanghai Communiqué. Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and senior staff member of the National Security Council Michel Oksenberg encouraged Carter to seek full diplomatic and trade relations with China. Brzezinkski and Oksenberg traveled to Beijing in early 1978 to work with Leonard Woodcock, then head of the liaison office, to lay the groundwork to do so. The United States and the People's Republic of China announced on December 15, 1978 that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979

Osea, el mayor anticomunista del estado de USA Zbigniew Brzezinski, anima a Carter a buscar el mayor y total acercamiento a China. Curiosamente el maestro de la operación Cyclon en Afganistan.

In February 1979, the Afghan government delivered a statement condemning China invading Viet Nam. In March, the Afghan government issued another communique accusing China of sending officers to train Afghan guerrillas and providing arms and financial assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In April, the Afghan media including its newspaper and broadcasting vilified China by alleging that China had trained Afghan "anti-revolutionary elements". The Chinese Foreign Ministry as well as the Chinese Embassy in Kabul made a number of presentations to the Afghan authorities to expose their lies and clarify the truth of events. The Sino-Afghan friendly relations had thus been severely damaged.

El gobierno de Afganistan denuncia a China, por su invasión a Vietnam, despues de la derrota de los Imperialistas yankes. China, por entonces, posiciono 1,500.000 soldados en las fronteras con la URSS por si habia escalada de coflicto al atacar a un aliado de la URSS, osease, Vietnam.

El gobierno de Afganistan, denuncia a China, por enviar supuestamente, a oficiales Chinos a entrenar a las Guerrillas en Afganistan, proveer armamento y apoyo financiero a los refugiados en Pakistan.

On December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Chinese government issued an official statement on December 30 strongly condemning the Soviet Union's armed invasion into Afghanistan. China did not recognize the Karmal regime in Afghanistan which was propped up by the Soviet Union. Therefore, China retained its Embassy in Afghanistan (at the level of Charge d'affaires a.i.), which, however, bore no official relation with the Afghan regime, except some routine work and consular and visa functions.

En definitiva, que China no vuelve a normalizar relaciones con Afganistan hasta que  la Republica Democratica de Afganistán Socialista no cae y se impone el Emirato Islamico de Afganistán.

Bien por esos comunistas, que luchan contra los Revisionistas que mayores logros sociales producen en la población, y que luchan en las mismas filas de los islamistas que propician que las mujeres lleven Burkas, en condiciones sociales en el pais que ni siquiera se habian visto en las Monarquias de antes de la Revolución del pais centro asiatico.

lo que puedo entender, es que ese "desastre" analitico en el posicionamiento de esos comunistas , no es tal, y que solo obedece a la geoestrategia politica de China en el teatro a tratar. Solo así se entiende que se luche contra un estado progresista en las filas de las fuerzas más retrogradas y reaccionarias!!


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Dzerjinskii escribió:Cuando la OTAN invadió Irak, los breznevistas (que hoy han decidido reivindicar a Stalin) planteaban que independientemente del pasado de Sadam ò el carácter del régimen iraquí, se debía apoyar a Irak.

En ese momento no importaba nada, si eran musulmanes, burgueses, feudales, nada.

 
Pero cuando se trata de Afganistán (y a veces hasta de Chechenia) la cosa cambia.

Todo se transforma en guerra justa o internacionalismo proletario y los musulmanes son retrógrados fundamentalistas religiosos que subyugan a las mujeres...

Es admirable como la URSS revisionista convirtió a los militantes de los PC revisionistas del mundo en excelentes agentes de su propaganda. No tienen nada que envidiarle a los EEUU.

Pero bueno, parece que la idea del imperialismo “menos malo” ha ganado la cabeza de los “comunistas” y que es legítimo que el progreso deba ser impuesto por las bayonetas extranjeras. Pero claro, a eso antes le llamábamos “propaganda colonialista” y ahora “internacionalismo proletario”.

Dzerjinskii escribió:Aunque no lo creas “NVSlit” la cosa es más sencilla de lo que parece. A ningún marxista leninista que se precie lo vas a ver criticando la ocupación de Finlandia o los países bálticos antes del ataque nazi fascista a la URSS, pero sí la intervención en Afganistán etc. y la cosa es simple, en una época se construía el socialismo y en la otra se restauraba el capitalismo, y creo que ambos partimos de que el fin justifica los medios. Creo que el confundido no soy yo, sino aquel que denuncia el revisionismo por restaurar el capitalismo en la URSS y luego le llama internacionalismo proletario a la intervención en Afganistán. A no ser claro, que no se considere a Brezhnev un revisionista.