¿Que es el Genocidio del Pueblo Soviético?

IonaYakir escribió:No queda muy en claro, se refiere al genocidio cometido por los soviéticos, o a los soviéticos?

NSV Liit escribió:

IonaYakir escribió:No queda muy en claro, se refiere al genocidio cometido por los soviéticos, o a los soviéticos?

¿qué genocidio cometido por los soviéticos?

y no me valen manipulaciones fascistas como las de Yuschenko en Ucrania...

Bueno, en serio, está claro que se refiere al genocidio cometido contra los soviéticos. Más que nada porque los soviéticos no cometieron genocidio contra ningún pueblo.

Saludos

IonaYakir escribió:
Cuando se habla de “genocidio” se refiere a una serie de crímenes contra la humanidad, con la intención de aniquilar a un grupo étnico, racial, político.. El asesinato de Yunchenko no posee ninguna de esas características.

pablomixto escribió:No tengo ni la mas minima idea ........ me dijeron que entrase aqui pero me superais todos , apenas se algo de marx y lenin y el DICTADOR ASESINO DE STALIN al que tanto amais ......

El Generalplan Ost (GPO) fue un plan secreto nazi de genocidio1 y limpieza étnica, concebido para ser realizado en los territorios ocupados por Alemania en Europa del Este durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El plan, preparado en los años 1939-1940, era parte del propio plan de Adolf Hitler de ampliar el Lebensraum alemán y la realización de la ideología del Drang nach Osten a favor de una expansión alemana hacia el este.


El grupo encargado del esbozo de este plan fue la Oficina Central de Seguridad del Reich (Reichssicherheitshauptamt - RSHA), el órgano de seguridad de las SS que era responsable en la lucha contra todos los enemigos del Nazismo. Se trata de un documento estrictamente confidencial y su contenido era conocido solo por aquellos que se encontraban en el más alto nivel de la jerarquía nazi.
Según el testimonio del SS-Standartenführer Dr. Hans Ehlich (uno de los testigos en el caso VIII anterior a los Juicios secundarios de Nürenberg), la versión final fue elaborada en 1940. Como un alto oficial de la RSHA, Ehlich era el responsable de la redacción del Generalplan Ost. Un precedente a este había sido el Ostforshung, una serie de estudios y proyectos de investigación llevados a cabo a lo largo de varios años por centros académicos para proveer la información necesaria. Las versiones preliminares fueron discutidas por el jefe de la SS Heinrich Himmler y sus colegas más confiables, incluso antes del estallido de la guerra. Esta circunstancia fue mencionada por el SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski durante su testimonio en el juicio de oficiales de la Oficina Central de Raza y Asentamiento de la SS (SS-Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt).
Casi toda la documentación del tiempo de la guerra sobre el Generalplan Ost fue deliberadamente destruida poco después de la derrota alemana en mayo de 1945.2 Luego, no se encontró ninguna copia del plan después de la guerra entre los documentos guardados en los archivos alemanes. No obstante, el hecho de que tal documento fue creado y usado por oficiales nazis está fuera de duda. Además del testimonio de Ehlich, existen varios documentos que hacen referencia a este plan o lo complementan. Aunque ninguna copia del documento real sobrevivió, muchos de los elementos esenciales del plan han sido reconstruidos a partir de memorandum, resumenes y otros documentos auxiliares.
Un documento principal que hizo posible la recreación del contenido del Generalplan Ost con gran precisión es un memo del 27 de abril de 1942 titulado Stellungnahme und Gedanken zum Generalplan Ost des Reichsführers SS ("Opiniones e ideas referentes al Plan General para el Este, del Reichsführer) y escrito por dr. Erich Wetzel, el director de la Oficina central de consejería sobre las cuestiones de política racial en el Partido Nacionalsocialista Alemán de los Trabajadores.

SS-18 escribió:Lo del otro es alucinante, No tengo ni idea de nada pero Stalin era un dictador asesino comeniños.

Amigo, ¿ por que no tienes ni idea de nada pero solo sabes que Stalin era un dictador asesino? jajajajajaj , muy facil, se llama programación propagandistica.

Te has visto un par de documentales de History Chanel y no te has parado nunca a coroborar los datos que te dan y asi es como has asimilado esa información sin valorar siquiera de donde procede.

The document below is, with minor alterations for clarity's sake, the official English-language translation of the original German document as presented in evidence at the Nuremberg military tribunals assembled in order to try suspected war criminals. The original German document is also available. (source: John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust: Selected Documents in Eighteen Volumes. Vol. 10: The Einsatzgruppen or Murder Commandos [New York: Garland, 1982], pp. 11-12])


In this document, Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau (1884-1942) of the German Sixth Army, in the southern sector of the German assault on the Soviet Union, reacts to reports of the softness of his troops by instilling them with particularly strong statements about their role in suppressing communism and Soviet Jewry. Reichenau was known as one of the most strongly Nazi of the leading German Wehrmacht (army) commanders. He died of a stroke only a few months after he issued this document to his troops. Other German commanders in the Soviet Union also used this document to instruct their troops. For further information, see Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 129-30.

Translation of Document No. NOKW-309 Continued Copy AOK 6

Sect. Ia-File No. 7

Army H.Qu., 10 October 1941

Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.

Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the Eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.

Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e. the annihilation of revolts in hinterland, which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.

The combating of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and degenerate women are still being made prisoners-of-war and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniform or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner-of-war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the pressing struggle.

The feeding of the natives and of prisoners-of-war who are not working for the Armed forces from Army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being bought by the command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.

When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the Eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw material and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civilian population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle, the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a "wait and see" attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judged and treated a member of the Soviet system.

The fear of German counter-measures must be stronger than threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Regardless of all future political considerations the soldier has to fulfill two tasks:

1.) Complete annihilation of the false Bolshevist doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.

2.) The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.

This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once and for all from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.

Commander-in-Chief

(signed) von Reichenau

Field Marshal

The Wehrmacht, the Holocaust, and War Crimes
[Please see the note concerning the provenance of files in this presentation]

Order #21 Signed by Keitel Concerning Jurisdiction of Miitary, SS, and Police Forces During Barbarossa, 13 March 1941
Fuhrer Decree on Disciplining of German Troops and Handling of Resistance in District Area "Barbarossa", 13 May 1941
Heydrich Directives Concerning Handling of USSR Prisoners of War, 28 June 1941/July 1941
Hitler's Order of the Day to Troops on the Eastern Front, October 2, 1941
Keitel Order Concerning Ruthless Suppression of Resistance in Occupied USSR, 16 September 1941
The copy reproduced of this document is dated 16 September 1941. The date given in the collation of the list of documents, Vol. 8 of the series, p.816, is 16 December 1941
Statement by the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Molotov, on German Attrocities in Occupied USSR, 1941
Rosenberg Letter to Keitel Concerning Maltreatment of USSR Prisoners of War, 28 February 1942
Combatting Single Parachutists, Keitel Order, 4 August 1942
Fuehrer Order Concerning Handling of Commandos, 18 October 1942
Memorandum by Brautigam Concerning Conditions in Occupied Areas of the USSR 25 October 1942
Kugel Erlass ("Bullet Decree"), 4 March 1944
Decree stipulating that escaped POWs are to be handed over to the SD for handling. They were then sent to Mauthausen Concentration Camp where they were executed.
A Short Historical Consideration of German War Guilt, by Alfred Jodl, 6 September 1945
The Origins of the Directives of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, by Wilhelm Keitel, 15 September 1945
The Position and Powers of the Chief of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, 9 October 1946
Notes by Keitel Concerning Actions of German Armed Forces During the War and in Occupied Territory 19 October 1945
These notes were prepared by Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, OKW, for the Chief of Investigation before the Nurnberg Tribunal, Mr. Dodd. They are noteworthy for the accounts advanced to justify those policies classified by the Allied powers as war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Affidavit of Generaloberst Franz Halder 22 November, 1945
This affidavit is of interest in connection with the decisions relating to the Anschluss, the invasions of Czechoslovakia, Poland and France, the approach of the OKW to the neutrality of Belgium and Holland, the reasons for the attack on the USSR, and details concerning the Commissar Order and the handling of USSR POWs.
Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945
Ohlendorf was a senior officer in the RSHA, an early Nazi Party member (1925) and, most importantly, the commander of Einsatzgruppe D, which was one of four special purpose Action Groups charged with the extermination of Jews, Commissars, Partisans and other "undesirable" segments of the USSR populace.
Political Way by Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945
Otto Ohlendorf, commander of Einsatzgruppe D, expounds his views on Fascism and National Socialism:
"These principles advocated, as the foremost goal of National Socialism, to develop the best characteristics of the people and to form them into a community of equality and to furnish the best possible spiritual and moral existence for the individuals of the people."
Testimony of Erwin Lahousen before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 30 November 1945
Trial of General Von Mackensen and General Maelzer. United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1949
Trial of Albert Kesserling. United Nations War Crimes Commission. 1949
The Dreierwalde Case. Trial of Karl Amberger. United Nations War Crimes Commission, 1947
Trial of Carl Bauer, Ernst Schrameck, Herbert Falten. United Nations War Crimes Commission. 1949
Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January 1946
Lahousen served in the Abwehr, the intelligence service of the OKW, between 1938 and 1943. He was one of Canaris' section chiefs and represented him at various conferences with senior OKW officers. His affidavit, provided to investigating officers for the Nuremberg Tribunal of the Major German War Criminals, provides information concerning plans for the destruction of elites in Poland and the killings of Russian POWs, and the attitude of senior OKW officers to them, particularly Keitel and Reinecke. Only those portions of the affidavit relating to policies pursued respecting the populations of occupied countries and war crimes are reproduced here.
German Crimes Against Soviet Prisoners-of-War in Poland. Central Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland. 1946
Nuremberg Charges
Hans Frank (Governor-General of non-annexed occupied Poland)
Alfred Jodl
Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Chief of the RSHA 1943-1945)
Wilhelm Keitel
Alfred Rosenberg
Artur Seyss-Inquart Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV
Julius Streicher
The General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V
The SS, Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V
The Geheime Staatspolizei (GESTAPO) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD) Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V, Part VI
Nuremberg Judgments
Frank, Goering, Jodl, Kaltenbrunner, Keitel, Rosenberg, Saukel, Streicher
Other Relevant Files
Book Reviews: Warfare, Third Reich
Documents Relating to the Holocaust, War Crimes and Genocide
Occupation Country Policies
Poland
USSR
Occupation Country Policies
USSR
[Please see the note concerning the provenance of files in this presentation]
Order #21 Signed by Keitel Concerning Jurisdiction of Miitary, SS, and Police Forces During Barbarossa, 13 March 1941
Fuhrer Decree on Disciplining of German Troops and Handling of Resistance in District Area "Barbarossa", 13 May 1941
Communication from the Commissar for White Ruthenia, Kube, to Rosenberg, Concerning Appropriation of Cultural Objects by the SS and the Wehrmacht, 29 September 1941
Secret Field Marshal v.Reichenau Order Concerning Conduct of Troops in the Eastern Territories. Dated 10 October, 1941
Correspondence and Report Concerning the Aktion of Police Battalion 11 in Sluzk, 27 October 1941
Molotov's Note on German Atrocities in Occupied Soviet Territory, 7 January 1942
Rosenberg Letter to Keitel Concerning Maltreatment of USSR Prisoners of War, 28 February 1942
Reinecke Order Concerning Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War, March 24, 1942
A Short Historical Consideration of German War Guilt, by Alfred Jodl, 6 September 1945
Memorandum by Brautigam Concerning Conditions in Occupied Areas of the USSR 25 October 1942
Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945
Ohlendorf was a senior officer in the RSHA, an early Nazi Party member (1925) and, most importantly, the commander of Einsatzgruppe D, which was one of four special purpose Action Groups charged with the extermination of Jews, Commissars, Partisans and other "undesirable" segments of the USSR populace.
Political Way by Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945
Otto Ohlendorf, commander of Einsatzgruppe D, expounds his views on Fascism and National Socialism:
"These principles advocated, as the foremost goal of National Socialism, to develop the best characteristics of the people and to form them into a community of equality and to furnish the best possible spiritual and moral existence for the individuals of the people."
Testimony of Erwin Lahousen before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 30 November 1945
Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January 1946
Lahousen served in the Abwehr, the intelligence service of the OKW, between 1938 and 1943. He was one of Canaris' section chiefs and represented him at various conferences with senior OKW officers. His affidavit, provided to investigating officers for the Nuremberg Tribunal of the Major German War Criminals, provides information concerning plans for the destruction of elites in Poland and the killings of Russian POWs, and the attitude of senior OKW officers to them, particularly Keitel and Reinecke. Only those portions of the affidavit relating to policies pursued respecting the populations of occupied countries and war crimes are reproduced here.
Alfred Rosenberg (Nuremberg Tribunal Charges, 1945)
German Crimes Against Soviet Prisoners-of-War in Poland. Central Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland. 1946
Nuremberg Charges
The General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V
Order #21Signed By Keitel Concerning Jurisdiction of
Military, SS, and Police Forces During Barbarossa
TOP SECRET
Top Secret
Only thru officer
OKW
Armed Forces Operational Staff
Section L (IV/ Qu)
44125/ 41 Top Secret
Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941
5 copies, 4th copy
Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section L( I) #33408/ 40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940
Directives for Special Areas to Order #21 (Case Barbarossa)
I. Area of operations and executive power
1. The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob. d. L.) has been reached.
It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.
2. The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:
a. The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.
b. In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.
c. As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.
3. For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command. The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:
a. Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
b. Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4).
c. Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
d. Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
e. Traffic regulations.
f. Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.
The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.
Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.
The time for the assumption of command by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.
4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the "Wi Rue Amt" with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/ Wi Rue Amt.
5. The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/ Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense.
6. The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and commanded.
II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:
7. Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the beginning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.
8. As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.
The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/ Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him shall decide on exceptions.
Except for the special regulations appIying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.
III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.
9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.
10. Police measures for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights. Further orders in this shall be issued later.
11. Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:
Procurement of food and feed.
Housing and machinery.
Purchase and the shipment of merchandise. Procurement of funds and wage-control.
Salaries.
Request for indemnity-payments.
Postal and telegraph services.
Traffic.
Jurisdiction.
Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be submitted to the OKW/ Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.
IV. Directives regarding Sweden.
12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
Signed : KEITEL
Distribution:
OKH-1st copy.
OKM-2nd copy.
R. d. L. u. O. K. L.-3rd copy.
Armed Forces Operational Staff-4th copy.
Section L-5th copy.

Best Regards from Russia,

The General Staff and High Command
of the Armed Forces
The Nuremberg Charges
Part III
Part I
Part II
Part IV
Part V

(b) War Crimes on the Eastern Front.
The order of October 1942 with respect to the murdering of captured commandos operated chiefly in the Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops. This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to commando operations. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type of warfare.
On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fighting in Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were fighting amongst a hostile population and had to face extensive partisan activities behind their lines. It will be shown that the activities of the German Armed Forces against partisans and other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the occupied territories, and to conduct its military operations, particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It will be shown that the German Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged with antipartisan activities. Members of the General Staff and High Command Group ordered, directed, encouraged, and were fully aware of these criminal policies and activities.
It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evidence concerning the activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe.
These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for the German Armed Forces even before the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (C-50) provided :
"Order "Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PROCEDURE IN THE AREA 'Barbarossa' and special military measures.
"The application of martial law aims in the first place at maintaining discipline.
"The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.
"This is possible only if the troops take ruthless action themselves against any threat from the enemy population.
"For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effective for the area 'Barbarossa' (area of operations, army rear area, and area of political administration).
"I. Treatment of offences committed by Enemy Civilians.
"1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts-martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.
"2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the mililtary, whether they are fighting or in flight.
"3. Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces, its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by the military, using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.
"4. Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first possible, persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.
"On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a Battalion Commander, collective despotic measures will be taken without delay against localities from which cunning or malicious .attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.
"5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement of civil courts.
"6. The C-in-Cs of the Army Groups may by agreement with the competent Naval and Air Force Commanders reintroduce military jurisdiction for civilians, in areas which are sufficiently settled.
"For the area of the 'Political Administration' this order will be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"II. Treatment of offences committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed Forces and its employees.
"1. With regard to offences committed against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution is not obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offence.
"2. When judging such offences, it must be borne in mind, whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people and the fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German has forgotten this fact.
"3. Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal measures are necessary. In the case of offences against inhabitants it will order a court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces call for such a measure. This applies for instance to serious offences originating in lack of self control in sexual matters, or in a criminal disposition, and to those which indicate that the troops are threatening to get out of hand. Offences which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores or other captured material to the disadvantage of our Forces should as a rule be judged no less severely.
"The order to institute proceedings requires in every single case the signature of the Judicial Authority.
"4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility of statements made by enemy civilians.
"III. Responsibility of the Military Commanders.
"Within their sphere of competence Military Commanders are personally responsible for seeing that:
"1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner on principles set out under 1 above.
"2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instructions and of verbal information in which the political intentions of the High Command were explained to C-in-Cs.
"3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command.
"IV. Security.
Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will be treated as "Most Secret":
"By order "Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
" (signed) Keitel" (C-50)
Less than three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, these instructions were amplified and made even more drastic. An order dated 16 September 1941 and signed by Keitel, was widely distributed (C-148). This order was of general application in all theaters of war, but was clearly of primary importance for the Eastern Front :
"Subject: Communist Insurrection in occupied territories.
"1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrection movements have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The type of action taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on individual members of the Armed Forces, into open rebellion and widespread guerilla warfare.
"It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed by Moscow, who is also responsible for the apparently trivial isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been otherwise quiet.
"In view of the many political and economic crises in the occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated, that nationalist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.
"This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort, which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occupying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces to the main centers of disturbance.
"2. The measures taken up to now to deal with general insurrection movement have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now given orders that we take action everywhere with the most drastic means in order to crush the movement in the shortest possible time.
"Only this course, which has, always been followed successfully throughout the history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can restore order.
"3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with the following general directions:
"a. It should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying Forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.
"b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud, the most drastic measures should be taken immediately on the first indication, so that the authority of the occupying Forces may be maintained, and further spreading prevented. In this connection it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing and a deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German soldier's life. The way in which sentence is carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect.
"The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively lenient penalties, and of being content, for purposes of deterrence, with the threat of more severe measures, does not accord with these principles and should therefore not be followed."
* * * * * * *
"4. The Commanding Officers in the occupied territories are seeing to it that these principles are made known without delay to al1 military establishments concerned in dealing with Communist measures of insurrection."
" [Indecipherable initial]
"Keitel" (C-148)
The German military leaders took up, sponsored, and instructed their troops to practice the racial policies of the Nazis. On 10 October 1941 a directive was issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, the Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the German 8th Army, then operating on the Eastern Front (UK-81). Reichenau (who died in 1942) was therefore a member of the group, and here is what he had to say:
"Subject: Conduct of Troops in Eastern Territories.
"Regarding the conduct of troops towards the bolshevistic system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been in-flicted upon German and racially related nations.
"Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i. e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused. by Jews.
"The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel partisans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of war and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain clothes and vagabonds are still being treated as proper soldiers, and sent to prisoner of war camps. In fact, captured Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents moving openly about the roads and very often eating at German field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.
"The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are not working for the Armed Forces from Army kitchens is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can spare under great sacrifices and things which are being brought by the Command to the front under great difficulties, should not be given to the enemy by the soldier not even if they originate from booty. It is an important part of our supply.
"When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire. The troops should be interested in extinguishing of fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets. Otherwise the disappearance of symbols of the former bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is part of the struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any importance in the eastern territories. The command issues the necessary directives for the securing of raw materials and plants, essential for war economy. The complete disarming of the civil population in the rear of the fighting troops is imperative considering the long and vulnerable lines of communications. Where possible, captured weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should this be impossible because of the situation of the battle so the weapons and ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are found using firearms in the rear of the army drastic measures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to that part of the male population who were in a position to hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous apparently anti-Soviet elements which originates from a 'wait and see' attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judges and treated a member of the Soviet System.
"The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than the threats of the wandering bolshevistic remnants. Being far from all political considerations of the future the soldier has to fulfill two tasks :
"1. Cormplete annihilation of the false bolshevistic doctrine of the Soviet State and its armed forces.
"2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty and thus the protection of the lives of military personnel in Russia.
"This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate the German people once for ever from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.
"Commander-in-Chief
" (Signed) von Reichenau
"Field Marshal." (UK-81)

Immediately preceding Reichenau's order is a memorandum, dated 28 October 1941, which shows that Reichenau's order met with Hitler's approval and was thereafter circulated by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. It is also clear that Reichenau's order was thereafter circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th Infantry Division on 27 November 1941. (UK-81)
These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German military leaders, it is no wonder that the Wehrmacht joined in the monstrous behavior of the SS and SD on the Eastern Front. Units (known as Einsatzgruppen) were formed by the SIPO and SD and sent out to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front, in order to combat partisans and to "cleanse" and "pacify" the civilian population.
In a directive dated 19 March 1943, the Commanding Officer of one of these units praised and justified such activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, the shooting of children, and the total burning down of villages (3012-PS). The officer directed that in order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German armament industry, "as a rule no more children will be shot" (3012-PS).
A report covering the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the. German occupied territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941 disregards every vestige of decency (R-102). It states cynically that, in the Baltic areas,
"spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination" (R-l 02).
This report shows clearly that "pacification" and "anti-partisan activity" are mere code words for "extermination of Jews and Slavs" just as much as "Weserubung" was a code word for the invasion and subjugation of Norway and Denmark.
Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggresion. Vol. II. USGPO, Washington, 1946, pp.316-400
[Note: The characters in brackets, eg, (2233-N-PS) refer to the official document numbers included in the series Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. A list of legal references and documents relating to the General Staff and High Command appears on pages 400-415. For information on the referencing of Internet sources see Chapter 4 of S D Stein Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet. Addison Wesley Longman 1999-published Nov.1998]
Error Submission Form
The General Staff and High Command
of the Armed Forces
The Nuremberg Charges
Part IV
Part I
Part II
Part III
Part V
War Crimes on the Eastern Front (part ii)
Documents quoted earlier show that the German Army was operating under similar policies and directives. It only remains to show that, in these practices, the Army and the SS worked hand in glove. The report describing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto (1061-PS) stresses the close cooperation between the SS and the Army:
"The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen SS, Police and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them." (1061-PS)
To the same general effect is a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner for Minsk (R-185). This report describes an anti-partisan operation in which 4,500 "enemies" were killed, 5,000 suspected partisans were killed, and 59 Germans were killed. The cooperation in this adventure by the German Army is shown in the following excerpt :
"The above mentioned figures show, that we have to count with a strong annihilation of the population. The fact that only 492 rifles were found on the 4,500 enemy dead, demonstrates that the numerous peasants from the country were also among the enemy dead. The battalion Direwanger is particularly known to have destroyed numerous human lives. Among the 5,000 partisan suspects who were shot, are numerous women and children.
"Units of the troops [Wehrmannschaften] also took part in the action, by order of SS Lt. General [Obergruppenfuehrer] von dem Bach. SA Colonel [Standartenfuehrer] Kunze led the troops [Wehrmannschaften] , who included also 90 members of my authority and of the district-commissarate Minsk-Stadt. Our men returned yesterday from the action without any losses. I refuse the use of officials and Reich-Employees of the General Commissarate in the rear areas. The men who work for me have not been classified as essential, after all in order to fight the partisans actively in the place of the Armed Forces and the Police.
"Of the troops [ Wehrmannschaften], one railroad employee had been wounded (shot through the lung). The political effect of this large scale action on the peaceful population had been disastrous, because of the numerous executions of women and children. The town BEGOMIE was cleared by the Armed Forces and the Police in December. The population of Begomie was predominantly favorable to us. Begomie, which has been fortified as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German Air Attacks during the fight ing." (R-135)
The SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach referred to in this quotation is mentioned in Himmler's speech to a gathering of SS generals at Posen on 4 October 1943 (1919-PS). In this speech Himmler announced the appointment of von dem Bach to be Chief of all anti-partisan units :
"In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the Anti-partisan Units" [Bandenkampf-Verbunde]. Our comrade SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one. Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successf ul.
"It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained (p. 58) for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step, which is the High Command of an army or even of a group-if you wish to call it that." (1919-PS)
The report of Einsatzgruppe A, (L-180) covering the period up to 15 October 1941, makes clear beyond doubt the participation of the German military leaders and Armed Forces in these extermination policies :
"Action-Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action, proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group North consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer-Group 4 had left the day before. Our task was to hurriedly establish personal contact with the commanders of the Armies and with the commander of the army of the rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer-Group 4 under Col. Gen. Hoeppner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings which cropped up with some authorities in the first days, were cleared up mainly through personal discussions."
* * * * * * *
"Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it. was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the World that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period."
* * * * * * *
"After the failure of purely military activities such as the placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had to look out for new methods. The Action-Group undertook to search for new methods. Soon therefore the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans. For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the struggle against the partisans."
* * * * * * *
"1. Instigation of self-cleansing actions.
"Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had suffered very heavily under the government of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the USSR, it was to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign government, they (i. e., the population themselves) would render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible. It was no less important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out.
"In Lithouania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kowno. To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithouanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several Synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithouania similar actions followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.
"These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily.
"It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar cleansing actions in Latvia. Essentially the reason was that the whole of the national stratum of leaders had been assassinated or destroyed by the Soviets, especially in Riga. It was possible though through similar influences on the Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against Jews also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed and about 400 Jews were killed. As the population of Riga quieted down quickly, further pogroms were not convenient."
* * * * * * *
"5. Other jobs of the Security Police.
"1. Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police. Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing personnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out and became a danger to the general security ; therefore
in Aglona (Lithouania).........................544 lunatics
in Mariampol (Lithouania)....................1O9 lunatics and
in Magutowo (near Luga)..................... 95 lunatics
were liquidated."
* * * * * * *
"When it was decided to extend the German operations to Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Action Group A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941 to parts of Action Detachments 2 and 3 and to the Staff of the Group to advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces of Action Group A which were intended to be used for Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express wish of Panzer-Group 4."
* * * * * * *
"Action detachment of Action Group A of the Security Police participated from the beginning in the fight against the nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thorough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equipment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on." (L-180).
Certain affidavits, furnished by responsible officials in both the Wehrmacht and the SS, fill in much of the background for the documents quoted above. An affidavit (3710-PS) by Walter Schellenberg who, at the time under discussion, was an important official in the RSHA, states:
"In the middle of, May 1941, as far as I remember, the Chief of Amt 4 of the RSHA (SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller), in the name of the Chief of the RSHA (SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich), held discussions with the Generalquartiermeister of the Army (General Wagner) about questions connected with 'the operations of the SIP0 and SD within the bounds of the Field Army during the imminent campaign against Russia. Wagner could come to no agreement with Mueller and therefore asked Heydrich to send another representa-tive. I was at that time Chief of Section E in Amt 4 of the RSHA under Chief of Amt Mueller and was sent by Heydrich to Wagner because of my experience in matters of protocol for the purpose of drawing up the final agreement. According to the instructions given to me, I was supposed to make sure that this agreement would provide that the responsible headquarters in the Army would be firmly obligated to give complete support to all activities of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIP0 and SD. I discussed the problem of this mutual relationship in great detail with Wagner. In accordance with this discussion I then presented him with the completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941.
"The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer's command, mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective armies which were to take part in the campaign.
"The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in detail:
"1. In front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field Army, tactically, functionally and administratively;
"2. In rear operational areas: in merely administrative subordination to the Field Army, but under command and functional control of the RSHA;
"3. In rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2;
"4. In areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in the Reich.
"The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification.
"The agreement made it clear that the administrative subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the communications network.
"This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my presence. Wagner signed it either 'acting for' or 'by order of' the OKH.
"After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete privacy the Fuehrer's command, which was apparently known in advance by each of them personally, and implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once more just to say goodbye.
"Today I read the 'Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941),' as well as the 'Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941.' The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews, Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear from the above-cited 'Comprehensive Report,' which embraces no more than the first four months of these operations, that the cooperation of the respective Oberbefehlshabers with Combat Group A was 'in general good and in individual instances, for instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner, very close, in fact almost cordial' (page 1). From an inclosure to this same report, bearing the title 'Summary of the Number of Executed Persons, ' particularly from the figures arranged according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as fully to carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and authenticity of both of the above cited reports. Therefore I must today express my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH channels of communication about the extensive future mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all other elements of resistance.
"In the beginning o f June 1941 all of the Ic counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and the Chief of the Amt for Counter-Intelligence Abroad in the OKW (Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part likewise present. I was also there. The essential substance and purpose of this meeting was to outline the military strategy against Russia and to announce the above-mentioned details of the written agreement, reached by Wagner and Heydrich.
"This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully instructed in several additional conferences, at which I was not present, about further details of the coming Russian campaign. I assume that these discussions were concerned with the exact delineation of the Fuehrer's command 'to smash utterly all resistance in occupied areas by every means and as quickly as possible,' including even planned mass executions of all elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation between the Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the above-cited documents is clearly revealed as existing but a few weeks thereafter, could not in my opinion have been forthcoming. In any event there is hardly any reason to doubt that these Ic counter-intelligence officers, immediately upon their return from Berlin, accurately informed their own superiors, including all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to march against Russia, about the full extent of the agreement."
" (signed) Walter Schellenberg
"26. XI. 45" (3710-PS)
Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggresion. Vol. II. USGPO, Washington, 1946, pp.316-400
[Note: The characters in brackets, eg, (2233-N-PS) refer to the official document numbers included in the series Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. A list of legal references and documents relating to the General Staff and High Command appears on pages 400-415. For information on the referencing of Internet sources see Chapter 4 of S D Stein Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet. Addison Wesley Longman 1999-published Nov.1998]
Error Submission Form

The General Staff and High Command
of the Armed Forces
The Nuremberg Charges
Part V
Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
War Crimes on the Eastern Front (part iii)
Conclusion
Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top level with respect to anti-partisan warfare (3711-PS) is sworn to by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army who worked in the War History Section of OKW from 1941 to 1945:
"I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
"Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I remember the following from my knowledge of the documents of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my conversations in the Fuehrer's headquarters with Generalmajor Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's appointee for the compilation of the history of the war.
"Counterpartisan warfare was originally a responsibility of Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to handle this matter.
"In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan warfare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of the OKW had to give it particular attention. In the Army Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a specific officer was assigned the development of counter-partisan warfare as his special job. It proved necessary to conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht troops in Russian as well as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines of communication and transport routes that were necessary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, causing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomotives.
"It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was conducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the OKW and in the Army's General Staff. It was further well-known that Hitler believed that the only successful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.
"I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side."
"( Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt
"Retired Captain of the Reserve" (3711-PS)
The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH and Himmler's headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that the plans and arrangements were made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same is true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops (the equivalent of a Lt. General in the American Army), has made three statements (3713-PS, 3714-PS). Roettiger was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:
"As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I. often had occasion to concern myself officially with antipartisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions.
"At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD.
"The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the antipartisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the army against the partisans." (3713-PS)
Roettiger's second statement reads :
"Supplementary to my above declaration I declare :
"As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.
"Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.
"( signed) Roettiger" (3713-PS)
Roettiger's third statement reads:
"During my period of service in 1942/ 3 as chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Central Army Group, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter- intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander-in-chief of the army group, Field Marshal von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this first and foremost was that the excesses of the SD units by way of execution of Jews and other persons assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the Army in its combat areas because of the aroused civilian populace. Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible, because of the danger which existed for our troops.
"( Signed) Roettiger" (3714-PS)
An extract from the War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff (Warlimont), dated 14 March 1943, deals with the problem of shipping off suspected partisans to concentration camps in Germany (1786-PS). It appears clearly from this extract that the Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity of treatment for suspected partisans, without at the same time obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories:
"The General Quartermaster [General Quartiermeister] together with the Economic Staff (East) [ Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to 'training centres in their own area, ' and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.
"In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wchrmacht-fuehrungstab] this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the 'peaceful population' which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case of an extension to the province of the latter.The High Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader [Hoehrer SS und Polizeifuehrer] and orders that the difference between 'punitive work' and 'work in Germany' is to be made clear to the population." (1786-PS)
A final group of four affidavits show that the SD Einsatzgruppen on the Eastern Front operated under the command and with the necessary support of the Wehrmacht, and that the nature of their activities were fully known to the Wehrmacht. The first of these is a statement (3715-PS) by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadefuehrer and Generalmajor of the Police, and was head of Himmler's personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:
STATEMENT
"I, Ernst Rode, was formerly chief of the Command Staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, having taken over this position in the spring of 1943 as successor to former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Generalmajor of Police and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish forces necessary for antipartisan warfare to the higher SS and police leaders and to guarantee the support of army forces. This took place through personal discussions. with the leading officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW and OKH, namely with General Warlimont, General von Buttlar, Generaloberst Guderian, Generaloberst Zeitzler, General Heusinger, later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg and Colonel v. Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was under the sole command of the respective Army commander-in-chief in operational areas (for instance in the Central Army Group under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch) and since police troops for the most part could not be spared from the Reichscommissariates, the direction of this warfare lay practically always entirely in the hands of the army. In the same way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH. SS and police troops transferred to operational areas from the Reichscommissariates to support the army groups were likewise under the latter's command. Such transfers often resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in the Reichscommissariates. According to a specific agreement between Himmler and the OKH, the direction of individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore possible that an army general could have SS and police under him, and on the other hand that army troops could be placed under a general of the SS and police. Anti-partisan warfare in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944 mostly through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister Wagner or through State Secretary Ganzenmueller. The OKH then issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned, for compliance.
"The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diabolical partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army troops as well as to those of the SS and police. There was absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were exactly as embittered against the enemy as those of the SS and police. As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly carried out by both components, a thing which was also quite in keeping with Himmler's desires or intentions. As proof of this the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced, which directed that all captured partisans, for instance such as Jews, agents, and political commissars, should without delay be handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment. This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan warfare no prisoners except the above named be taken. That anti-partisan warfare was carried on by army troops mercilessly and to every extreme I know as the result of discussions with army troop leaders, for instance with General Herzog, Commander of the XXXVIII Army Corps and with his chief of staff, Colonel Pamberg in the General Staff, both of whom support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that anti-partisan warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic annihilation of Jewry and Slavism.
"(Signed) Ernst Rode" (3715-PS)
Another and shorter statement by Rode reads:
"As far as I know, the SD Combat Groups with the individual army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders- in-chief were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and operational methods of these units. They approved of these missions and operational methods because apparently they never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews, agents and commissars, who were handed over to the SD underwent the same cruel death, as victims of so-called 'purifications,' is a proof that the executions had their approval. This also corresponded with what the highest political and military authorities wanted. Frequent mention of these methods were naturally made in my presence at the OKW and OKH, and they were condemned by most SS and police officers, just as they were condemned by most army officers. On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have been quite within the scope of the authority of the commanders- in-chief of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions and methods. If they should, ever assert that they would then have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders-in-chief, this, in my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge.
"(Signed) Ernst Rode" (3716-PS)
In an affidavit by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who at the beginning of the Russian campaign was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division, the following statement is made:
"At the beginning of the Russian campaign I was the first General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had the mission of driving across the Bug north of Brest-Litovsk. Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division received through channels from the OKW a written order of the Fuehrer. This order directed that Russian commissars be shot upon capture, without judicial process, immediately and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to companies, the Commanding General of the XXXVII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Troops Lemelsen) forbade its being passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to him from military and moral points of view.
" (Signed) Bogislav v. Bonin "Colonel" (3718-PS)
Finally an affidavit (3717-PS) by Heusinger, who was a Generalleutnant in the German Army, and who from 1940 to 1944 was Chief of the Operations Section at OKH, states as follows:
"1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.
"When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.
"This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance, all troops (security units, SS units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.
"All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"The high SS and police leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and police units within operational areas, a high commander of the army could be designated commander of the operation.
"During anti-partisan operations within operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.
"2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the population, as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.
"3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.
"4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest po litical and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I. always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.
"(Signed) Heusinger "Generalleutnant." (3717-PS)
(At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral'testimony. His testimony on direct examination was sub-stantially to the same effect as his affidavit 3712-PS.)
(c) Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humunity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment.
The foregoing evidence against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the troops to take "ruthless action", left it to the discretion of any officer to decide whether suspected civilians shouId be immediately shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander to take "collective despotic measures" against localities. Offenses committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where desirable in order to maintain discipline ,and security from a military standpoint.
Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by the OKW that "a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing" and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100 Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they were to take "revenge on sub-human Jewry" and that they were not merely soldiers but "bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of bestialities". The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen, the behavior of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers joined in their savagery. The Einsatzgruppen were completely dependent upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to be given to these activities.
The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment.
C. Conclusion.
The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster, and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner Welles, has written (" The Time for Decision", 1944, pp. 261-262) that:
"* * * the authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German General Staff.
"It will be said that this insistence that the German General Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance of other factors in German history. They all have their place. But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and channelled through, the German General Staff ."
* * * * *
"Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the population is given to that military force controlled and guided by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will continue making its plans for the future."
The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with the most evil forces at work in Germany. "Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired", Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942.
It was said above that the German militarists were inept as well as persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in 1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be voluntary allies ; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of President Hindenburg in August 1934, the German officers swore a new oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a man, Adolf Hitler. It was not until 18 days later that the law requiring this change was passed. A year later the Nazi emblem became part of their uniform and the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire military machine.
No doubt these generals will ask what they could have done about it. It will be said that they were helpless, and that to protect their jobs and families and their own lives they had to follow Hitler's decisions. No doubt this became true. But the generals were a key factor in Hitler's rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs. It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim mercy on the ground that his fellow conspirators threatened him with harm should he withdraw from the plot. In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and organizations charged in the Indictment. The bearers of a tradition not devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration to save their own skins.
Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 829-PS
Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. III. USGPO, Washington, 1946, p.p.597-599
Keitel Order Concerning Ruthless Suppression of any
Resistance in Occupied USSR
TOP SECRET
COPY
The Chief of the OKW
WFST. / Abt. L (IV/Qu)
Nr. 002060/ 41 g. Kdos.
F. H. Qu., 16 September 1941
40 copies, 32nd copy
Subject: Communist insurrection in the occupied territories.
1. Since the campaign against Soviet Russia started there have been communist insurrections everywhere in the territories occupied by Germany. The actions range from propaganda and assaults against single members of the armed forces to open revolt and spreading guerilla warfare.
It should be noted that this is a mass movement which is centrally directed from Moscow and to which also the single and seemingly trifling incidents are to be ascribed occurring in areas which have been quiet so far.
Due to the manifold political and economic tensions in the occupied territories we must also expect nationalistic and other groups to take advantage of the situation and to instigate difficulties for the German occupation troops by joining the communist insurrection.
This way an increasing danger for the German conduct of the war arises which becomes apparent first by generally unsafe conditions for the occupation troops and already has led to troops being, detached to the main centers of the unrest.
2. Previous measures to counteract this general communist insurrection have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now ordered that everywhere the most drastic means are to be employed in order to quench the movement within the shortest time possible. Only in this manner which has always been employed successfully by great nations in the history of their conquests quiet can be restored.
3. The following directives are to be observed:
a. In each case of revolt against the German occupation force Communist sources are to be su

(b) The SS as an exterminator of "inferior" races.

Domination of Europe through a Nazi Elite required more, however, than the positive side of racism-that is, the building up of a numerous "biologically superior" group. It necessarily meant also the destruction of other races. The SS had to be, and was, taught not merely to breed, but to exterminate. In a speech delivered at Kharkov in April 1943, Himmler declared:

"We have-I would say, as very consistent National Socialists-taken the question of blood as our starting point. We were the first really to solve the problem of blood by action, and in this connection by problem of blood, we of course do not mean antisemitism. Antisemitism is exactly the same as delousing. Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness. In just the same way, antisemitism for us, will soon have been dealt with. We shall soon be deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then the matter is finished within the whole of Germany." (1919-PS)

But it was not merely against Jews that SS efforts were directed. All non-Nordic races were similarly condemned. In his Posen speech, Himmler stated this basic principle of the SS:

"One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS men : We must be honest, decent, loyal and comradely to members of our own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech, does not interest me in the slightest. What other nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary, by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only so far as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an antitank ditch interests me only insofar as the antitank ditch for Germany is finished." * * *
"That is what I want to instil into this SS and what I'believe I have instilled in them as one of the most sacred laws of the future." (1919-PS)

(c) Indoctrination of members in SS racial theories.

These were the principles which were publicly reiterated, over and over again, so that the newest recruit was thoroughly steeped in them. In his Kharkov speech to the commanding officers of three Waffen SS divisions, Himmler strongly insisted on indoctrinating all SS members in his theories of the racial struggle.

"This is what is important for us as SS men, for, our province of duty and our mission (it is a task additional to those of the whole German armed forces and the whole German people): That is what I would like to impress upon you. This is what I beg you as commanding officers, as chiefs and as leaders, to teach the young men again and again in their ideological instruction. That is what I demand and exact of you-that you really concern yourself with the man, the young fellow of 17 or 18 who comes to us, and with many who are in our ranks not as volunteers but as conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our spirit and are fighting as the old guard fought before us-that is what I request and demand of you.
"We have only one task-to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle without mercy." 1919-PS)

This function of the SS men in the racial struggle was publicly proclaimed in the Organizations Book of the NSDAP for 1943:

"He openly and relentlessly fights against the most dangerous enemies of the State: Jews, Freemasons, Jesuits and political clergymen." (2640-PS)

(7) Functions and activities with respect to commission of war crimes.

During the war great use was made of the peculiar qualities possessed by the SS-qualities not only of its combat force, but of its other components as well-in executing tasks embracing the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

(a) "Antipartisan" operations.

A directive issued by Keitel on 13 March 1941, making preparations 3 months in advance for the attack on Russia, provided that in the area of operations the Reichsfuehrer SS was entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration-tasks which would result from the struggle about to commence between two opposing political systems. (447-PS)

One of the steps taken by the Reichsfuehrer SS to carry out those "special tasks" was the formation and use of so-called "antipartisan" units. They were discussed by Himmler in his Posen speech:

"In the meantime I have also set up the Chief of the antipartisan units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenfuehrer von dem Bach is Chief of the antipartisan units. I considered it necessary for the Reidhsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are best in position to take action against this enemy struggle, which is decidedly a political one. Except where units which had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been very successful.
"It is notable that by setting up this department, we have gained for the SS in turn, a division, a corps, an army, and the next step-which is the High Command of an army or area of a group-if you wish to call it that." (1919-PS)

What the SS did with its division, corps, and army, out of which the antipartisan units were formed, is illustrated in the "Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the Task Forces of the Security Police and SD in the U. S. S. R.," covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941 (R-102). The report shows that so-called "anti-partisan" activity was actually nothing but a name for extermina-tion of Jews and persons believed politically undesirable. The report is a carefully organized and detailed description of such extermination. Section I describes the stations of the various Task Forces involved, and section II their activities. The latter section is divided into parts, each dealing with a different geo-graphical region-the Baltic area, White Ruthenia, and the Ukraine. Under each area the report of activities is classified under three headings : (a) Partisan activity and counteraction ; (b) arrests and executions of communists and officials; and (c) Jews. The following units were involved (R-l02):

"The present stations are

"Task Force A : since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.
"Task Force B : continues in Smolensk.
"Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.
"Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.

"The Action and Special Commandos (Einsatz und Sonder Commandos) which are attached to the Task Force continue on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been assigned to them." (R-102)

The section headed "Baltic area" and subsection labeled "Jews" read as follows (R-102):

"Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination.
"However, the Estonian Protective Corps (Selbtschutz), formed at the time of the entry of the Wehrmacht, immediately started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the SD." * * *
"The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still in progress. After completion. of this action there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern Territory." (R-102)

In the section headed "White Ruthenia," the subsection labeled "Partisan activity and counteraction," the following appear:

"In Wultschina 8 juveniles were arrested as partisans and shot. They were inmates of a children's home. They had collected weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search the following were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles, several thousand rounds of ammunition, several hand grenades, and several packages of poison gas, Ebrit.

"b. Arrests and executions of communists, officials, and criminals.

"A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was devoted to the combatting of Communists and criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63 officials, NKVD agents and agitators.(R-102)

The preceding subsection ends with the following statement:

"The liquidations for the period covered by this report have reached a total of 37,180 persons." (R-102)

And under the section headed "Ukraine," the subsection "Jews," this statement occurs:

"Shitomir
In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot,. because from expe-rience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propa-ganda and saboteurs." (R-1 02)

The foregoing report deals with the activities of four Task Forces-A, B, C, and D. The more detailed report of Task Force A up to 16 October 1941 shows great variety of SS components in such a task force:

"This description of the over-all situation showed and shows that the members of the Stapo [The Secret State Police], Kripo and SD [Security Service] who are attached to the Action-Group, are active mainly in Lithouania, Latvia, Esthonia, White-Ruthenia and to a smaller part in front of Leningrad. It shows further that the forces of the uniformed police and the Armed SS are active mainly in front of Leningrad, in order to take measures against the returning population and under their own officers. This is so much easier because the Action detachments in Lithouania, Latvia and Esthonia have at their disposal native police units, as described in encl. 1, and because so far 150 Latvian reinforcements have been sent to White-Ruthenia.
"The distribution of the leaders of Security Police and SD during the individual phases can be gathered from encl. 2, the advance and the activities of the Action-Group and the Action-detachments from encl. 3. It should be mentioned that the leaders of the Armed-SS and of the uniformed police who are reserves have declared their wish to stay on with the Security Police and the SD." (L-180)